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Worms are malicious programs that spread over the Internet without human
intervention. Since worms generally spread faster than humans can respond,
the only viable defence is to automate their detection.
Network intrusion detection systems typically detect worms by examining
packet or ﬂow logs for known signatures. Not only does this approach mean
that new worms cannot be detected until the corresponding signatures are
created, but that mutations of known worms will remain undetected because
each mutation will usually have a di erent signature. The intuitive and
seemingly most e ective solution is to write more generic signatures, but
this has been found to increase false alarm rates and is thus impractical.
This dissertation investigates the feasibility of using machine learning
to automatically detect mutations of known worms. First, it investigates
whether Support Vector Machines can detect mutations of known worms.
Support Vector Machines have been shown to be well suited to pattern recog-
nition tasks such as text categorisation and hand-written digit recognition.
Since detecting worms is e ectively a pattern recognition problem, this work
investigates how well Support Vector Machines perform at this task.
The second part of this dissertation compares Support Vector Machines
to other machine learning techniques in detecting worm mutations. Gaussian
Processes, unlike Support Vector Machines, automatically return conﬁdence
values as part of their result. Since conﬁdence values can be used to reduce
false alarm rates, this dissertation determines how Gaussian Process compare
to Support Vector Machines in terms of detection accuracy. For further
comparison, this work also compares Support Vector Machines to K-nearest
neighbours, known for its simplicity and solid results in other domains.
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The third part of this dissertation investigates the automatic generation of
training data. Classiﬁer accuracy depends on good quality training data – the
wider the training data spectrum, the higher the classiﬁer’s accuracy. This
dissertation describes the design and implementation of a worm mutation
generator whose output is fed to the machine learning techniques as training
data. This dissertation then evaluates whether the training data can be used
to train classiﬁers of su ciently high quality to detect worm mutations.
The ﬁndings of this work demonstrate that Support Vector Machines can
be used to detect worm mutations, and that the optimal conﬁguration for
detection of worm mutations is to use a linear kernel with unnormalised
bi-gram frequency counts. Moreover, the results show that Gaussian Pro-
cesses and Support Vector Machines exhibit similar accuracy on average in
detecting worm mutations, while K-nearest neighbours consistently produces
lower quality predictions. The generated worm mutations are shown to be
of su ciently high quality to serve as training data. Combined, the results
demonstrate that machine learning is capable of accurately detecting muta-
tions of known worms.Acknowledgements
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Introduction
1.1 The worm problem
Worms are malicious programs that spread over the Internet without human
intervention [1, 2]. Like some biological viruses they infect hosts through
known weaknesses, cause what damage they can, and then use the host as a
springboard to ﬁnd other vulnerable victims.
The ﬁrst Internet worm was unleashed in 1988 and brought down hun-
dreds of machines across the USA [3], at the time a signiﬁcant portion of
the early Internet. Worms proliferated as the Internet matured into a global
network, wreaking havoc and causing considerable ﬁnancial damage [4].
None of the damage, however, came close to the $2.6 billion caused by
Code Red [5, 6]. Code Red exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft’s Internet
Information Services (IIS) [7] web server to infect its victims. The ﬁrst, rather
unsuccessful version of Code Red, attempted to spread itself by generating
a set of random IP addresses that it then tried to infect. Yet, there was a
fatal ﬂaw in this version: it used a static seed to generate the IP addresses,
which meant that all infected hosts generated the same set of IP addresses.
This ﬂaw prevented the worm from spreading far.
Several days after Code Red’s arrival, a change in its behaviour was ob-
served: it began to probe new hosts. The change in behaviour was due to an
updated version of Code Red, identical in all aspects except for the random
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
number generator, which now used a dynamic random seed. This mutation
enabled it to infect 359,000 hosts in less than 14 hours [6].
A worm that spread even faster was the Slammer [8] worm, which in-
fected most of its 75,000 victims within 10 minutes. This worm was the ﬁrst
Warhol [9] worm observed in the wild, a name coined from Andy Warhol’s fa-
mous quote that “in the future, everybody will have 15 minutes of fame” [10],
and based on the worm’s ability to spread to most vulnerable machines within
15 minutes.
Despite their prominence, Code Red and Slammer are just two of the
more infamous worms drawn from the large pool of lethal worms that have
swamped the Internet over the last decade. Study of those worms leads to
the following observations about worm behaviour:
• the initial release of each worm is typically followed by one or more
mutations
• each mutation tends to be more lethal than its predecessors, by reﬁning
the attack or infection strategy
• they spread signiﬁcantly faster than humans can respond
These observations suggest that an attractive defence strategy against worms
is to automate the detection of their mutations, and this strategy is the focus
of this dissertation.
Today’s network intrusion detection systems [11] – software designed to
detect security breaches such as worms – typically use either anomaly de-
tection or misuse detection. Anomaly detection [12] systems model normal
tra c and detect intrusions by looking for abnormalities. But normal tra c
is often hard to model, especially with tra c such as peer-to-peer and email
relaying exhibiting worm-like characteristics. Misuse detection [13] systems
match network tra c to models of intrusions known as signatures, which
means that only intrusions whose signatures are known can be detected.
Although there is substantial ongoing research into improving anomaly
detection systems, misuse detection systems have emerged as the de facto
standard since they are both simple and scalable. When it comes to rapidly
spreading intrusions such as worms, however, misuse detection systems haveCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
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Figure 1.1: Automatically detecting worm mutations with ma-
chine learning. The learning phase is trained with network ﬂows
labelled as malicious or benign (top), producing a classiﬁer that
can distinguish between malicious and benign ﬂows (bottom).
a serious limitation: generating the signature itself [14]. Signatures are typ-
ically created by security experts who manually analyse network logs after
intrusions have occurred, a time consuming and error-prone task. Given the
ferociousness of today’s worms, by the time a signature has been handcrafted
the worm may have already spread to the far ends of the Internet.
This work proposes to use machine learning based pattern recognition
techniques to eliminate that bottleneck with regard to worm mutations. The
idea is to train a machine learning classiﬁer to distinguish between worm
(malicious) and benign ﬂows, and so avoid the need to explicitly generate
signatures; by ﬁnding distinguishing patterns, machine learning techniques
implicitly generate signatures to classify unknown ﬂows as malicious or be-
nign (Figure 1.1). In particular, this work investigates:CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
• Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [15] are a machine learning
technique known to perform particularly well at pattern recognition
tasks such as text categorisation and hand-written digit recognition.
Since detecting worms is e ectively a pattern recognition problem, this
work applies SVMs to detect mutations of known worms. Speciﬁcally,
this dissertation investigates the optimal conﬁguration of SVMs and
associated kernel functions to classify worms.
• Comparison of SVMs to other machine learning methods. A
shortcoming of Support Vector Machines is that they do not return a
conﬁdence value with their predictions, often leading to unnecessary
false alarms. Since Gaussian Processes (GPs) [16] automatically return
conﬁdence values with their prediction, this work compares SVMs to
GPs in this particular domain. For further comparison, this disserta-
tion also compares SVMs to K-nearest neighbours [17], known for its
simplicity and solid results in other domains.
• Generating worm mutations for training data. Classiﬁer accu-
racy depends on good quality training data – the more diverse the
training data, the higher the classiﬁer’s accuracy. This work describes
the design and implementation of a worm mutation generator whose
generated mutations can be fed to the machine learning techniques as
training data. This work evaluates whether the quality of the generated
training data is su cient for machine learning classiﬁers.
1.2 Thesis statement
Network intrusion detection systems typically detect worms by examining
packet or ﬂow logs for known signatures. This means that worms cannot be
detected until after the signatures are created; in particular it means that
mutations of known worms will remain undetected since they usually have a
di erent signature.
I assert that it is possible to build an accurate network intrusion detectionCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
system that automatically detects mutations of known worms using machine
learning techniques. I will prove this assertion by:
1. Characterising the e cacy of di erent machine learning techniques for
detecting synthetic mutations
2. Applying the most accurate machine learning technique to a wide va-
riety of worm mutations
3. Devising an innovative technique for generating su cient mutations of
known worms to train the chosen technique
1.3 Contributions
This work contributes to the defence against computer worms and their often
devastating e ects in a number of ways:
• Demonstrating the feasibility of machine learning based pattern recog-
nition techniques to detect mutations of known worms
• Comparing how e ectively the Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours machine learning techniques detect
worm mutations
• Designing a framework that automatically generates worm mutations
to be used as training data for machine learning classiﬁers
1.4 Publications
The work reported on in this dissertation has led to the following publication:
O. Sharma, M. Girolami, and J. Sventek, Detecting worm vari-
ants using machine learning, in CoNEXT 07: Proceedings of the
2007 ACM CoNEXT conference, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 112,
ACM, 2007 [18].CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.5 Outline
The remainder of this work is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides background information on worms and network intru-
sion detection, and describes related work by examining existing worms
as well as intrusion detection systems optimised for detecting worms.
Chapter 3 presents an an overview of machine learning, followed by a de-
tailed overview of the three prominent machine learning techniques that
this work investigates: Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes,
and K-nearest neighbours.
Chapter 4 introduces a system that applies machine learning to detect
worm mutations. The chapter describes how network data is trans-
formed into a format that is understood by machine learning tech-
niques, and then proposes how to deploy machine learning techniques
to detect mutations of known worms.
Chapter 5 investigates whether machine learning techniques in general, and
Support Vector Machines in particular, are suited to detect worm mu-
tations. It describes and analyses a set of experiments used to test this
suitability.
Chapter 6 compares the Support Vector Machines’ results from the pre-
vious chapter to two alternative techniques – Gaussian Processes and
K-nearest neighbours – and discusses their relative advantages and dis-
advantages in detecting worm mutations.
Chapter 7 introduces a worm mutation generator to overcome lack of train-
ing data in the real world that threatens to starve machine learning
methods of training data. Speciﬁcally it examines whether the gen-
erated mutations o er su ciently high quality training data for the
machine learning classiﬁers.
Chapter 8 summarises the suitability of machine learning for automatically
detecting worm mutations, in particular, the relative strengths andCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
weaknesses of Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-
nearest neighbours. It also revisits the e ectiveness of the training data
produced by the worm mutation generator.
Chapter 9 explores opportunities for future work. Possible opportunities
include defending against sophisticated worm attack strategies, design-
ing a custom kernel, alternative feature representation, real-time detec-
tion, online training, cascading classiﬁers, and scaling the infrastructureChapter 2
Worms and Intrusion Detection
The previous chapter highlighted the threat posed by worms and their mu-
tations. This chapter now turns to the existing defence mechanisms against
this worm menace. To better understand how worms can be detected, the
ﬁrst part of this chapter devotes itself to background information on worms
– what kind of damage they cause, how they infect their hosts and how they
spread. The second part scrutinises existing network intrusion detection sys-
tems, focusing on recent systems designed to detect worms.
2.1 Worms
Worms1 [1, 2] are malicious programs that spread themselves to hosts on the
Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities [20, 21] such as bu er overﬂows [22], in
software applications. They are essentially computer viruses [23] that spread
without the need of human intervention. Although initial worm experiments
had already taken place in the early 1980’s [1], the ﬁrst Internet worm wasn’t
released until 1988. Named after its author, the Morris worm brought down
hundreds of machines, at that time a signiﬁcant portion of the Internet.
As the Internet evolved into a global network, worms emerged as a global
security threat. Several worms were released [4] in the decades that followed,
1The name worm originates from the tapeworm programs in the science ﬁction novel
The Shockwave Rider [19] published in 1975.
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wreaking havoc and causing considerable ﬁnancial damage.
Even when worms are not designed to damage hosts but simply spread
as fast as possible, they still severely disrupt networks by generating vast
amounts of tra c [24] in similar ways that spam email is clogging the Inter-
net. However, worms usually also carry additional payloads to damage indi-
vidual hosts, rather than just negatively a ecting their network connectivity.
This payload allows the worm to execute arbitrary and potentially malicious
code, with past damages ranging from defacing websites to corrupting ﬁles all
the way to erasing entire hard disks. The potential for damage is not limited
to software: even physical damage could be caused, for example by forcing
insu ciently cooled machines to overheat with incessant heavy workloads.
2.1.1 Challenges in defending against worms
There are a number of challenges in successfully defending against worm
attacks, including:
• Excessive number of vulnerabilities. Today’s Internet has mil-
lions of hosts, directly accessible through public Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses. Millions more are indirectly accessible behind gateways,
routers and ﬁrewalls. Combined with the thousands of software appli-
cations (and often hundreds of di erent versions of particular software
applications), worms are o ered a vast number of potential backdoors
through which to spread.
• Immediate feedback. With today’s high speed Internet connections
and trunks, worm authors have close to immediate feedback on whether
their worm is successful. This enables worm authors to churn out new,
more lethal versions much more quickly than manually maintained net-
work intrusion detection systems can react.
• Ease of access. Coding worms was never easier. Websites provide all
the necessary ingredients to produce a successful worm, from tutorials
and source code, to entire development frameworks [25].CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 10
2.1.2 Worm attack strategies
To defend against a worm intrusion one must understand its strategy and line
of attack. This section details the two stages in a worm’s attack: infection
and proliferation.
2.1.2.1 Infection
How do worms inﬁltrate their victims in the ﬁrst place? Worms are just
computer programs, so for them to self-replicate and propagate, they must
be executed with su cient privileges. If they cannot be executed or do not
have su cient privileges once executed, they are rendered harmless.
But how can one bring a remote host to execute the worm programs?
Worms exploit low-level software vulnerabilities in services running on the
remote host. These vulnerabilities abound in today’s Internet, not least
thanks to the large number of hosts that run outdated software whose vulner-
abilities have been known for years. Common vulnerabilities include bu er
overﬂows [22], integer overﬂows [26], incorrect handling of format strings [27],
and faulty memory management [28, 29].
Vulnerabilities typically share the common trait of causing a computer’s
program counter to jump to the beginning of the worm’s executable payload,
thereby executing the worm program. From then on life is easy for the worm
since it then runs at the same privilege as the vulnerable service in question,
which more often than not means it has administrator (unrestricted) rights.
If not, it is possible to combine the infection vulnerability with a second
vulnerability that elevates the privileges of the worm.
2.1.2.2 Proliferation
Once the worm has successfully infected a vulnerable host, it typically self-
replicates and spreads itself over the network. There are several spreading
strategies it can use, ranging from simply generating a set of random IP
addresses, to more sophisticated spreading strategies such as systematically,
in a co-ordinated fashion, scanning ranges of IP addresses. The in-depthCHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 11
discussion of worm spreading strategies in [10] reveals just how rapidly worms
can spread when working in co-ordinated fashion.
As with some biological viruses, the number of hosts infected grows ex-
ponentially initially, until the majority of vulnerabilities have been infected.
In later stages, the growth slows, typically due to network congestion and
human intervention2.
The key defence strategy is to stop worms in their initial stages. Worms
such as Slammer [8] have demonstrated that the time window to line up a
defence is less than 15 minutes, too short for human intervention. The only
way, then, is to automate the detection of the worm and thus halt its spread
in that critical ﬁrst quarter of an hour.
2.1.3 A brief case study of worms
This section deepens the conceptual understanding of the previous section
with concrete case studies of some of the most infamous worms. The case
studies focus on the worm’s infect-spread attack cycles.
2.1.3.1 Code Red
Code Red [6, 5] exploited a bu er overﬂow vulnerability in Microsoft’s Inter-
net Information Services (IIS) [7] web server to infect hosts. Once infected,
Code Red generated a set of random IP addresses to which it then tried to
spread. There was a fatal ﬂaw in this worm: it used a static seed to generate
the IP addresses, which meant that all infected hosts generated the same set
of IP addresses. This ﬂaw prevented the worm from spreading far.
Several days after Code Red’s initial appearance, a change in its behaviour
was observed: it began to probe new hosts. The change in behaviour was
due to an updated version of Code Red, identical in all aspects except for the
random number generator, which now used a dynamic random seed. This
mutation enabled it to infect 359,000 hosts in less than 14 hours [6].
2Interestingly, computer worms spread similarly to human disease; for an approach
that uses a cyberspace equivalent of a Centre for Disease Control to help defend against
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2.1.3.2 Slapper
Slapper [31] is a Linux worm that exploits a vulnerability in the OpenSSL [32]
module used by older versions of the Apache web server [33]. It was let loose
into the wild less than two months after the vulnerability in OpenSSL [32]
was disclosed in July 2002.
Although the Slapper worm caused nowhere near as much damage as
Code Red had in the previous year, it raised some interesting points. First,
it showed that Linux is also susceptible to worm infections, dispelling the
common myth of worms being a Windows problem. And second, it was the
ﬁrst worm to build up a peer-to-peer overlay of infected hosts (known as a
botnet [34]) that enabled them to be remotely controlled for, say, distributed
denial of service attacks [35].
How does Slapper infect its hosts? Slapper is launched with a single
parameter – the target’s IP address. First, it ﬁngerprints this host to check
if it is running a vulnerable version of Apache. It does this by sending an
invalid HTTP GET request to which Apache responds with its version number.
Slapper looks up this version in a hard-coded list, and if present proceeds
with the attack.
Next, Slapper initiates an SSL handshake [36] with the server by sending
a client hello message to OpenSSL. The server responds by sending the
client its certiﬁcate. Usually a client would now respond by sending the
server its public key together with the key’s length. But this is where the
vulnerability lies: OpenSSL does not check that the key’s length is within
certain bounds, facilitating a bu er overﬂow attack.
Slapper fakes its certiﬁcate and overstates the key’s length so that when
the server sends back the key it also sends additional data to Slapper. Since,
as the name suggests, OpenSSL is open source, Slapper knows exactly which
variables and data structures are returned as a result of requesting a too
large key. Among other information, OpenSSL returns a reference to a data
structure stored on the heap, which if overwritten allows arbitrary shell code
to be executed.
To overwrite the heap value Slapper overﬂows the bu er a second time.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 13
The second overﬂow only works because Apache’s connections are handled
by a process pool rather than a thread pool. Under normal circumstances
new connection requests are served from the pool, unless all processes are
busy, in which case a new child process is spawned. These child processes
are identical to their parents, including the heap allocations. To force a new
process to be spawned, Slapper exhausts the process pool by rapidly initiating
20 connections. The next request for a new connection is then guaranteed to
be a new child process.
All in all, this makes a total of 23 ﬂows3 that Slapper needs to infect a
host. The actual code run in the exploit loads the worm’s source code from
the client to the server, compiles, and executes it.
Slapper serves as an excellent case study because it is one of the few
worms where the source code is easily available, and as such can be tailored
to the purposes of this work. Old versions of Linux and Apache are also
easier to obtain and install than legacy editions of Windows and the IIS web
server.
2.1.3.3 Slammer
A worm that spread even faster was the Slammer [8] worm, which infected
most of its 75,000 victims within 10 minutes. Slammer, which was released
in January 2003, exploited a bu er-overﬂow vulnerability in Microsoft’s SQL
Server, which was reported 6 months earlier in July 2002. This worm was
the ﬁrst Warhol [9] worm observed in the wild, a name coined from Andy
Warhol’s famous quote that “in the future, everybody will have 15 minutes
of fame” [10], and based on the worm’s ability to spread to most vulnerable
machines within 15 minutes.
Slammer’s strength lies in it’s simplicity: it does nothing more than inﬁl-
trate the host using the above mentioned vulnerability, and then continuously
generates random IP address and spreads itself to those hosts if it ﬁnds them
to be vulnerable. Although Slammer does not perform anything malicious
on the host, the sheer volumes of tra c it generated caused large network
3One for the initial probe, 20 to exhaust the pool, and two for the bu er overﬂows.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 14
outages [8]. Slammer’s growth initially followed an exponential curve and
was later ironically slowed by the collapse of many networks due to denial of
service caused by Slammer itself.
The entire Slammer worm occupies only 376 bytes and ﬁts in a single
UDP packet. Due to this small size and because it used UDP rather than
TCP, Slammer was often able to slip past heavily congested networks where
legitimate tra c could not. Using UDP also meant that the worms spread
was limited by available bandwidth rather than network latency, as is the
case with TCP-based worms such was Code Red. Another beneﬁt of using
UDP over TCP is that UDP does not require a connection to be set up,
which meant that packets could simply be ﬁred and forgotten, rather than
having to keep track of multiple connections, for example with threads which
are limited in number by the operating system, and drastically increase a
worm’s complexity.
Although Slammer was the ﬁrst successful Warhol worm, it was not per-
fect. Moore et al [8] suggest that minor changes, such as a better random
IP address generator, could have further improved its spread. Additionally,
Slammer was eventually slowed down by blocking UDP port 1434, the MS
SQL server port; had it used a more popular service port, such as that of
HTTP or DNS, this strategy could have rendered the World Wide Web un-
usable.
2.1.3.4 Witty
A worm that targeted a bu er overﬂow vulnerability in several Internet Secu-
rity Systems (ISS) products was the Witty worm [37], which began to spread
in March 2004 and infected around 12,000 hosts. The worm gets it’s name
from the payload it carries, which contains the phrase: insert witty message
here.
The witty worm is interesting due to several distinguishing features. First,
it was the ﬁrst widely propagating worm that carried a destructive payload.
Second, it had the shortest known interval between disclosure of the vulnera-
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disclosed. And third, it was launched in an organised, highly co-ordinated
manner with numerous ground-zero hosts.
Witty’s attack cycle is fairly straightforward:
1. Seed the random number generator using system time.
2. Send 20,000 copies of itself to random targets.
3. Select a hard disk at random.
4. If successful overwrite a randomly chosen block on this disk, and start
over with step 1.
5. If unsuccessful, start over with step 2.
This process repeats until either the infected machine is rebooted or crashes,
for example when Witty manages to overwrite a system critical section of
the hard disk.
The Witty worm was observed to have infected 110 hosts within the
ﬁrst ten seconds and 160 at the end of 30 seconds, indicating that a large
number of initial hosts were seeded with the worm before launching the
ﬁrst attack wave. Given that the worm began to spread only a day after
the vulnerability was disclosed, it is likely that these initial hosts had been
previously compromised.
Like the Slammer worm, the Witty worm used the UDP protocol and was
therefore bandwidth limited, rather than latency limited as is the case with
TCP worms. Additionally, Witty worm cloaked itself by padding its packets
with arbitrary data varying in size between 796 and 1307 bytes.
2.1.3.5 Blaster
The Blaster4 [38] worm was released into the wild in August 2003, and ex-
ploited a bu er overﬂow vulnerability in the Distributed Component Object
Model (DCOM) Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [39], a service for communi-
cating with objects distributed across networked hosts, in Microsoft Windows
4The Blaster worm is also referred to as the Lovesan worm because it carries the hidden
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XP and Windows 2000. As a side e ect, the worm also caused instability in
the RPC service on other Windows versions, including Windows NT, Win-
dows XP 64, and Windows Server 2003.
The worm attacks as follows:
1. It connects to TCP port 135 and overﬂows the DOM RPC service with
excessive amounts of data.
2. The bu er overﬂow overwrites a critical memory section and facilitates
shell access on TCP port 4444 with local system access.
3. Via the newly granted shell access, Blaster invokes tftp.exe, an FTP
client to transfer its payload (mblast.exe). Transferring the payload
from the attacking host rather than hard-coded servers makes it more
di cult to detect the worm.
4. Blaster sets an entry in the Windows registry to launch the executable
on the next boot. This keeps Blaster alive on the target host even when
the machine is rebooted.
5. The worm reboots the system to launch the executable payload.
6. The infected host then listens on UDP port 69 for connections from
newly compromised hosts.
Once it has infected its host, Blaster launches attacks on a regular basis. If
the date is between August 15th and December 31st it continuously launches
distributed denial of service attacks against windowsupdate.com. Blaster also
repeats these attacks on the 15th of every month outside the date range. The
attack ﬂoods destination port 80 with 50 TCP SYN packets (40 bytes each)
per second.
To spread itself, Blaster ﬁrst generates a random IP address of the form
A.B.C.0, where A, B, and C are random values between 0 and 254. It then
incrementally scans the entire subnet A.B.C.0 – A.B.C.254 for new victims.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 17
2.2 Intrusion detection systems
Network intrusion detection systems [11] are specialised intrusion detection
systems [40, 41] that monitor network tra c for security breaches such as
worms. These systems are typically deployed at network gateways, allowing
them to act as ﬁlters for all incoming tra c.
Since the machine learning worm detectors proposed in this work are in-
tended to augment or replace existing intrusion detection systems, it makes
sense to look at the common approaches to intrusion detection and better
understand how they work. This will be the task of the ﬁrst part of this sec-
tion. The second part then presents an overview of popular network intrusion
detection systems, focusing on those features that deal with worms.
2.2.1 Approaches to intrusion detection
There are two common approaches to network intrusion detection: anomaly
detection and misuse detection. In anomaly detection [12], systems are
equipped with a model of normal tra c and detect intrusions by comparing
tra c to this model and looking for abnormalities. A weakness is that the
diversity of network tra c makes it di cult to demarcate normal tra c.
Email relaying and peer-to-peer queries, for example, exhibit worm-like traf-
ﬁc characteristics. Matters are complicated further because abnormal tra c
does not necessarily constitute an intrusion.
In misuse detection [13], on the other hand, systems are equipped with
models of intrusions, known as signatures, which are matched to network traf-
ﬁc. A signature is a ﬁngerprint that can be used to identify intrusions. In its
simplest form, it consists of a string of characters (or bytes), but many cur-
rent intrusion detection systems [42, 43] also support regular expressions [44]
and even behavioural ﬁngerprints [45]. A problem with misuse detection is
that only intrusions whose signatures are known can be detected.
Although there is substantial ongoing research into improving anomaly
detection systems, misuse detection systems have emerged as the de facto
standard for intrusion detection since they are both simple and scalable.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 18
When it comes to rapidly spreading intrusions such as worms, however, mis-
use detection systems have a serious limitation: generating the signature
itself [14].
Signatures are typically created by security experts who analyse network
and host logs after intrusions have occurred. This involves sifting through
thousands of lines of log ﬁles – an error-prone and time-consuming undertak-
ing. Given the ferociousness of today’s worms, by the time a signature has
been handcrafted the worm may have already spread to the far ends of the
Internet.
2.2.2 Case studies of intrusion detection systems
How are the approaches to network intrusion detection from the previous
section applied in practice? This section presents popular network intrusion
detection systems, focusing on their worm detection features.
2.2.2.1 Snort
Snort [43] is a popular open source network intrusion detection system that
belongs to the family of misuse detection systems. Snort works by string
matching observed network tra c to a database of known intrusions. To
be e ective, this database must be updated frequently, which is why there
are several mechanisms in place to ensure that new signatures are shared
throughout the Snort community quickly and easily.
Snort ﬁrst divides the tra c based on destination port number. Then a
rule (or signature) can restrict itself to particular known header values, or dig
deeper and perform content matching on the payload. Since string matching
is a relatively expensive operation, it is important to ﬁlter out as much as
possible before resorting to content inspection.
Initially Snort focused only on the inspection of single packets. After
several successful evasions [46], however, Snort was extended to support full
TCP ﬂow reassembly. This enables Snort to perform pattern matching across
packet boundaries, greatly increasing its success rate.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 19
2.2.2.2 Bro
Bro [42] is another open source network intrusion detection system, although
its approach is more reﬁned than Snort’s since it works at the application
protocol level. However, Bro can handle Snort signatures by means of a
conversion script that is shipped with Bro.
Bro works by ﬁrst assigning a protocol analyser based on preliminary
information, primarily the protocol number, that it extracts from the ﬁrst few
bytes of reassembled ﬂows. The protocol analysers themselves then generate
events based on various protocol speciﬁc data exchanges. For example, a
hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) analyser generates an event for every
HTTP GET request. These events in turn are parsed by policy scripts that
accompany the protocol analysers. These policy scripts are written in a
dedicated scripting language designed for easy manipulation of the received
events and data.
Bro’s stream assembly and protocol analysis is a heavy-weight process
and as such should only be done on ﬂows where it is absolutely necessary.
To reduce the number of ﬂows it analyses, Bro ﬁlters unwanted ﬂows using
primitive packet ﬁltering.
2.2.2.3 Earlybird
Earlybird [14] was one of the ﬁrst research systems dedicated to ﬁngerprinting
new worms, thereby automating the signature generation process. It does this
by building a histogram of all byte strings in all packets that it observes and
constructs signatures for the most frequent ones. Earlybird’s fundamental
assumption is that since worms try to spread to many hosts in a short period
of time, strings that occur frequently at widely dispersed network locations
must belong to a worm.
Earlybird reduces false alarm rates by comparing the current string with
lists of benign strings that are known to occur both frequently and appear at
widely dispersed network locations. These lists of benign strings are known
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2.2.2.4 Autograph
Autograph [47] takes the same approach as Earlybird by assuming that worms
generate bursts of similar tra c to widely dispersed network locations. It
improves over Earlybird, by (i) using a heuristic ﬁlter to narrow down the
tra c it has to inspect, and (ii) observing entire ﬂows rather than just single
packets.
The heuristic ﬁlter simply classiﬁes all ﬂows originating from port-scanning
sources as suspicious, based on the observation that many worms scan IP ad-
dress ranges in search of vulnerable hosts. Autograph generates signatures
from the suspicious ﬂow pool by dividing ﬂows into content blocks, and then
applying a greedy algorithm to pick out the most prevalent blocks.
Like Earlybird, Autograph attempts to reduce false alarms with white
lists. The authors suggest a training period to collect information to produce
these white lists.
2.2.2.5 Polygraph
Polygraph [48] is a misuse detection system that generates signatures for
polymorphic worms by extracting string similarities in pools of suspicious
and innocuous ﬂows. Polymorphic worms are worms that mutate themselves
at every hop when spreading throughout the network; the possible resilience
of the work proposed in this dissertation to polymorphic worms is discussed
in Section 5.1.1.3.
Polymorphic worms use a number of mutation strategies, such as cor-
rupting its own signature, and Polygraph suggests di erent string matching
algorithms, each optimised for a speciﬁc strategy. If the mutation strategy is
unknown, they suggest experimenting with each algorithm and selecting the
one that yields the least false alarms.
Polygraph extends Autograph’s framework to ﬁngerprinting polymorphic
worms. The authors argue that continuous byte strings, such as used in sig-
natures for Autograph are not su cient to describe polymorphic worms. The
underlying assumption is that a polymorphic worm, although it changes its
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mon at each incarnation. In most cases that common fraction is the exploit
code, which Polygraph tries to deduce with string matching algorithms such
as ﬁnding the longest common sub-sequence [49].
2.2.2.6 PayL
PayL [50, 51] is an anomaly-based detection system that builds tra c models
based on byte frequency distributions in packets.
In the modelling phase, PayL categorises packets according their desti-
nation port, length, and byte frequency distribution of their payload. It
generates these byte frequency distributions by iterating over the payload
using a sliding window of size one-byte, and storing a histogram of observed
bytes. The average frequency and standard deviation of each byte over all
histograms for packets with the same destination port and length are then
stored as the tra c models.
Likewise, in the classiﬁcation phase packets are ﬁrst categorised according
to their destination port, then length, and the distance of the payload’s byte
frequency distribution to the model’s byte frequency distribution. Anomalous
packets are those were this distance is above a certain predeﬁned threshold.
An extension using n subsequent bytes rather than just single byte dis-
tributions was proposed in [51]; this technique, known as n-gram extraction,
is used in this dissertation and covered in detail in Section 4.4.
2.2.2.7 Ensemble of one-class classiﬁers
Similar to this dissertation, Perdisci et al [52] use Support Vector Machines
to detect intrusions. The fundamental di erence is that Perdisci et al [52]
take the anomaly detection approach, while this dissertation takes the mis-
use detection approach. The model of normal tra c is based on PayL’s
n-gram extraction, except that higher n-grams are extracted with 2v-gram
approximation5.
5This technique uses a sliding window size of 2 and approximates greater values of n
by incrementing the window by v steps, when traversing the data.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 22
Another di erence is that Perdisci et al [52] propose an ensemble of one-
class SVMs, while this dissertation proposes binary (two-class) Support Vec-
tor Machines. Furthermore, the one-class SVMs in Perdisci et [52] use only
a single kernel, whereas this work investigates a number of kernels. Kernels
and binary classiﬁers will be covered in the background section on Support
Vector Machines (Section 3.2).
The ﬁnal di erence is that Perdisci et al [52] investigate a wide range of
n-gram values with 2v-gram approximation. They show that 2v-grams yield
good results, however propose the use of multiple classiﬁers, each operating
in a di erent feature space, for optimal results. By contrast this dissertation
investigates only n-gram values in the range 1-3, and will demonstrate in
Section 5.3.3.1 that 2-grams yield solid results. Feature extraction using
n-grams is described in detail Section 4.4.
2.2.2.8 Vigilante
Vigilante [53] is a misuse detection system that, unlike other intrusion de-
tection systems discussed so far, monitors code executed on individual hosts
rather than network tra c ﬂows. Vigilante determines whether a network
connection is malicious by running all instructions in a shielded virtual ma-
chine, where it monitors for illegal memory accesses and bu er overﬂows.
An advantage of Vigilante is that it can detect rapidly spreading worms
where exploits are unknown without blocking innocuous tra c. Another
advantage is that Vigilante can rapidly contain a worm in its early stages
because it disseminates any intrusion it detects to nearby Vigilante hosts,
e ectively building a distributed worm detection system.
On the downside, being a host-based detection system by nature means
that Vigilante (i) has to be installed on each host in the network, (ii) monitor-
ing machine instructions in a virtual environment is computation-intensive,
and (iii) programming bugs such as pointer errors could be wrongly ﬂagged
as intrusions, resulting in a high false alarm rate.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 23
2.2.2.9 Honeycomb
Honeycomb [54] is a misuse detection system that generates signatures by
observing tra c in honeypots. Honeypots [55] are virtual systems that have
been deployed on hosts that have not been assigned a domain name and
are not publicised in any way. They lure worms, based on the assumption
that any attempted communication with these machines must be malicious
since the only way of obtaining their IP address is through random probing.
Honeycomb generates a signature for incoming tra c by ﬁnding the longest
common substring in two network connections.
False alarms are easily generated if legitimate tra c reaches the honey-
pots, for example by attackers who deliberately send benign tra c to these
honeypots.
2.3 Summary
This chapter presented background information and related work on worms
and intrusion detection systems.
Worms are malicious programs that automatically spread themselves to
hosts on the Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities of known services, often
wreaking havoc and caused considerable ﬁnancial damage. The exemplar
worms covered in this chapter were:
• Code Red, which exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft’s Internet In-
formation Services web server and infected 359,000 hosts in less than
14 hours.
• Slapper, a Linux worm that exploited a vulnerability in the OpenSSL
module of the Apache web server, and built a peer-to-peer overlay of
infected hosts, allowing them to be remote controlled.
• Slammer, which was the ﬁrst Warhol worm released into the wild
that spread to 75,000 victims within 10 minutes using a vulnerability
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• Witty exploited a bu er overﬂow vulnerability in several Internet Se-
curity Systems just a day after the vulnerability was disclosed, and
cloaking its rapid spread by padding itself with arbitrary data.
• Blaster targeted Windows’ DCOM RPC with a bu er overﬂow, down-
loading its payload with an FTP call-back, and registering itself with
the Windows Registry to survive reboots.
Intrusion detection systems are special purpose monitoring systems that
attempt to detect intrusions such as worms. Generally. there are two ap-
proaches to network intrusion detection: anomaly detection, which builds
models of normal tra c and ﬂags all tra c that does not conform to this
model, and misuse detection, which scans for signatures of known intrusions.
Exemplar intrusion detection systems covered in this chapter include:
• Snort and Bro, two widely used open source misuse detection sys-
tems. Snort matches network packets to rules with string matching,
while Bro works with protocol speciﬁcs (such as HTTP GET requests).
All rules must be handcrafted.
• Earlybird, Autograph, and Polygraph, three intrusion detection
systems that automatically generate signatures by using string algo-
rithms, such as ﬁnding the longest common subsequence, to di erenti-
ate between pools of benign and malicious ﬂows.
• PayL and One-Class, two anomaly detectors that use byte frequency
distributions to model the tra c.
• Vigilante, a host-based intrusion detection system that runs instru-
mented software in a shielded environment that monitors for malicious
code such as illegal memory accesses and bu er overﬂows.
• Honeycomb, an intrusion detection system that generates signatures
by observing tra c in virtual systems that have been deployed on decoy
hosts that have not been assigned a domain name and are not publicised
in any way.CHAPTER 2. WORMS AND INTRUSION DETECTION 25
The following chapter presents background information of Machine Learn-
ing in general, and three techniques (Support Vector Machines, Gaussian
Processes, and K-nearest neighbours) in particular. Chapter 4 then combines
the background of this and the next chapter to present a network intrusion
detection system that uses machine learning to automatically detect worm
mutations.Chapter 3
Machine learning
This chapter presents background information on Machine Learning, specif-
ically three prominent supervised learning methods: Support Vector Ma-
chines [15], Gaussian Processes [16], and K-nearest neighbors [17].
3.1 Introduction
Machine learning [56, 57, 58] is a sub-discipline of artiﬁcial intelligence that
involves developing algorithms to automatically recognise patterns using sta-
tistical classiﬁcation. Examples of patterns it can recognise include ﬁnger-
prints, images, handwriting, voice recordings, and, as this dissertation will
show, worms.
Formally, in statistical classiﬁcation [57] a pattern is represented by d
features occupying a point in a d-dimensional space (the feature space). The
d-dimensional vector deﬁning a particular pattern is called the pattern vector.
Consider the pattern recognition problem of classifying a person as male or
female given only statistical facts about that person. A possible feature
set consists of the height, weight, and age. The feature space would be 3-
dimensional, and a 36 year old person weighing 72kg and measuring 1.80m
would occupy the pattern vector < 36,72,180 > in that feature space.
The aim of machine learning is to select features so that pattern vectors
belonging to di erent categories (such as male and female) can be partitioned
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into disjoint regions within the feature space. Seen from a di erent angle, the
e ectiveness of a feature set is determined by how well it partitions pattern
vectors into di erent regions.
3.1.1 Why machine learning?
What makes machine learning attractive for worm detection? The answer is
that machine learning o ers a number of key advantages over rival pattern
recognition methods.
One of the simplest such rival methods is template matching (for ex-
ample [59]), where the pattern to be recognised is matched against stored
prototypes (templates), taking into account possible mild alterations such as
rotation or scaling. Simple template matching is computationally demanding
and fails to recognise distortions to the pattern such as a change of viewpoint.
Most of all, template matching depends on the availability of templates to
match against, whereas machine learning techniques are able to learn these
patterns from training data.
Another rival pattern recognition method is the syntactic approach [57].
The underlying idea is that a pattern is composed of smaller sub-patterns that
are themselves composed of sub-patterns, and so on, down to the simplest
sub-patterns called primitives. The pattern can then be seen as a sentence
in a language where the primitives are the alphabet. A language syntax
– consisting of the alphabet and a set of grammatical rules – governs how
complex patterns can be created. Although intuitive, the challenges posed
by the syntactic approach is how to subdivide patterns in the ﬁrst place,
especially when noise is introduced (as is often the case in network ﬂows
carrying worms). Another drawback is the heavy computation required to
perform the subdivisions.
3.1.2 Supervised vs. unsupervised learning
In machine learning the learning stage can be either supervised or unsuper-
vised. In supervised learning the learning stage is told what class a trainingCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 28
data item belongs to, for example that pattern < 36,72,180 > belongs to
the male class. In unsupervised learning only the pattern vectors but not the
class they belong to are fed to the learning stage, leaving it to the learning
stage to cluster the pattern vectors.
Another way of looking at the di erence between supervised and unsu-
pervised learning is that in supervised learning the training data is already
grouped into regions before it enters the learning stage, and the goal is to
classify unknown pattern vectors based on their proximity to a particular
group. In unsupervised learning, on the other hand, the learning stage must
ﬁrst discover groups of similar pattern vectors in the input data.
This dissertation will use supervised learning because of the similarity
between worm tra c and normal tra c [60].
3.1.3 Parametric vs. non-parametric methods
Besides supervised and unsupervised learning, machine learning techniques
can be either parametric or non-parametric. A parametric model is a data
set that can be described by a ﬁnite number of parameters, for example
a normally distributed data set can be deﬁned by its mean and standard
deviation. A parametric method estimates the parameters of a model; this
learned model is then used for classiﬁcation or regression.
Parametric methods are appealing: once the parameters are learned the
computations are highly e cient because they operate on the model param-
eters and not on the data items in that model. But parametric methods
have two severe drawbacks. First a bad model (caused by over-ﬁtting or
insu cient data) could lead to gross errors in classiﬁcation or regression.
And second, many real world problems (such as worm detection) cannot be
modelled accurately with a set of parameters.
Because of the risks posed by parametric models, this dissertation devotes
itself exclusively to non-parametric methods. Non-parametric methods have
the additional advantage that they require no prior knowledge about the
distribution and any inference can thus be made directly from the training
data. In other words, non-parametric models o er greater ﬂexibility sinceCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 29
they require only a similarity measure to be deﬁned between objects.
3.2 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines [61, 15, 62, 63] is a supervised learning method for
automatic pattern recognition. It emerged in the mid 1990s from a combi-
nation of two independent research streams:
• Advances in Computation Learning Theory, a mathematical discipline
that analyses machine learning algorithms, and
• Development of kernel functions [64, 65] that e ciently transform non-
linearly separable data into linearly separable data
Combining the two streams resulted in a machine learning method that uses
an optimisation algorithm rather than a time-consuming greedy search.
Since their inception, Support Vector Machines have been successfully
applied to solve a large number of real-world pattern recognition problems
including text categorisation [66], image classiﬁcation [67], and hand-written
character recognition [15].
Support Vector Machines can be used for classiﬁcation and regression.
Regression ﬁnds the curves of best ﬁt for a given data set, while classiﬁcation
categorises a given data set into two or more classes. This work is interested
in classiﬁcation only, speciﬁcally in classifying network ﬂows as malicious
(carrying a worm) or benign. For this reason the remainder of this section
will discuss Support Vector Machines in the context of classiﬁcation only; for
information on regression, see [68].
The rest of this section is organised as follows. First comes an overview
of how Support Vector Machines work. This overview will provide an intro-
duction to Support Vector Machines in a systems context, with emphasis on
detecting worm mutations; interested readers can ﬁnd the underlying math-
ematics in Appendix A1. This section then provides an example application
1For a formal treatment of Support Vector Machines, see also [63]CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 30
Figure 3.1: Classiﬁcation involves dividing the training data by
a separating hyperplane. In 2-dimensional space as in the above
ﬁgure the hyperplane is a line.
of Support Vector Machines. The ﬁnal parts of this section are devoted to
kernels, which are needed to classify more complex data sets.
3.2.1 How Support Vector Machines work
Classiﬁcation in general is achieved by dividing the training data into disjoint
groups. If the data is linearly separable, then in 2-dimensional space these
disjoint groups can be pictured as being separated by a dividing line, as
shown in Figure 3.1. More generally for higher dimensions the data will
be separated by a hyperplane, sometimes also called the decision surface.
Equipped with the hyperplane, the classiﬁer can then label a given test data
point based on its position relative to the hyperplane.
For a given data set there may be more than one separating hyperplane,
as depicted in Figure 3.2, and individual classiﬁcation techniques can be dis-
tinguished by which hyperplane they choose. In particular, the crucial dif-
ference between Support Vector Machines and other classiﬁcation techniques
such as perceptrons [69] is that Support Vector Machines ﬁnd the optimal
separating hyperplane by maximising the margin between the hyperplane
and a subset of training data points called the support vectors, pictured inCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 31
Figure 3.2: There may be more than one separating hyperplane for
a given data set; x will be classiﬁed depending on which separating
hyperplane is used.
Figure 3.3. Support vectors are the key data points close to the hyperplane
that, if removed, would change the location of the hyperplane.
3.2.2 An example
As an example of how Support Vector Machines classify data, consider again
determining a person’s gender given only a set of statistical data about that
person. To make matters a bit simpler than in the earlier example, assume
that the features height and weight are enough to determine a person’s gen-
der.
Finding the hyperplane can be visualised as plotting the given heights
and weights in a two dimensional co-ordinate system and drawing a line (the
separating hyperplane) that divides the points into regions male and female.
While there are many possible separating lines, the optimal hyperplane would
be the one which maximises the distance between training points of the maleCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 32
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(a) Removing a support vector a ects the position of the hyperplane.
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(b) Removing a vector that is not a support vector, does not a ect the postion of the
hyperplane.
Figure 3.3: Support Vector Machines ﬁnd the optimal separating
hyperplane by maximising the margin between the hyperplane and
a subset of the training data points called the support vectors. By
deﬁnition, removing a support vector moves the location of the
hyperplane.CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 33
Figure 3.4: The optimal hyperplane maximises the distance from
any training point.
and female classes, as shown in Figure 3.4.
3.2.3 Non-linearly separable data and the kernel trick
As mentioned earlier in this section, given a set of pattern vectors and their
classiﬁcation, Support Vector Machines determine the maximum margin sep-
arating hyperplane. Unfortunately, this is not always that straightforward –
it is often the case that data is simply not linearly separable. This is where
the so-called kernel trick [61] comes to the rescue.
A kernel is deﬁned as a measure of similarity between two pattern vectors.
Conceptually, kernels equip Support Vector Machines with the ability to map
non-linearly separable data points into a di erent dimension where they are
linearly separable. Consider as an example the data points in Figure 3.5:
the data set on the left is not linearly separable, yet looking at the data, it
is easy to picture an elliptical boundary that distinguishes between the two
classes. The trick, then, is to map the data points into a dimension where
they are linearly separable, as shown in the right diagram.
Mapping data points to a higher dimension is seemingly costly. More di-
mensions would mean larger vectors, which in turn would mean larger mem-
ory requirements and longer calculation times. Thanks to kernels, however,CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 34
Figure 3.5: Support vector machines deal with linearly inseparable
data by implicitly mapping it to a dimension where it is separable.
SVMs do not need to store these high dimensional vectors explicitly. Ker-
nels are a means of implicitly deﬁning a feature space via the inner product
in that space. In other words, kernels encapsulate the mapping into higher
dimensions and the similarity calculations in that dimension without having
to store the mapped data points [63].
Since the kernel handles the critical job of ﬁnding a way to separate
– and thus classify – the data, it is the key parameter in a Support Vector
Machine. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet choice of kernel: each kernel
has its advantages and disadvantages for the data in question. For this
reason, one of the aims of this work is to ﬁnd the optimal kernel conﬁguration
for Support Vector Machines to detect worms. To this end, the following
candidate kernels have been examined:
• Linear kernel [15]. This is the standard SVM kernel that tries to
ﬁnd a dividing hyperplane by calculating the dot product on pattern
vectors in the original feature space (no mapping to a higher dimension
is performed). Being the standard kernel and operating in the input
feature space renders it a simple kernel as a basis for comparison.
• Radial basis function kernel (RBF) [15]. This kernel applies aCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 35
Gaussian function to the pattern vectors, implicitly taking them to a
higher (inﬁnite) space. Being a radial basis function it operates solely
on the length of the patterns and not the direction or position. The
RBF kernel has become popular thanks to its good performance in a
wide range of applications [66, 70].
• String kernel [71]. Originally developed for categorising text docu-
ments [71] such as spam email, the string kernel maps the input strings
into the feature space generated by all sub-strings of a given length,
to which it then applies the inner product. Since a network ﬂow is a
stream of bit strings the string kernel o ers itself as a strong candi-
date [72].
Of the above kernels, the RBF kernel is often suggested as a reasonable
ﬁrst choice [73] because of its solid general-purpose performance, and unlike
the linear kernel it can deal with non-linearly separable data by implicitly
mapping the input feature space into a higher dimension. This dissertation
investigates in Chapter 5 whether this holds true for worm detection. Addi-
tionally, it has been shown that the linear kernel is a special case of the RBF
kernel [74] – intuitively a very wide and short Gaussian distribution can be
thought of as linear.
What about other kernels such as the polynomial and sigmoid kernels? A
disadvantage of the polynomial kernel [15] is that it has more hyperparame-
ters than the RBF kernel, making the search for an optimal combination more
time consuming. Additionally, the RBF kernel has less numerical di culties,
while the sigmoid kernel has been shown invalid for certain parameters [75].
3.2.4 Support Vector Machines revisited
Figure 3.6 summarises the Support Vector Machines cycle discussed so far,
consisting of a learner and classiﬁer stage. The learner is supplied with
labelled training data, from which it derives the Support Vectors with the
help of the kernel. Depending on the kernel, this will be in the input feature
space (as is the case for linear kernels) or in a richer feature space (as is theCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 36
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Figure 3.6: Support Vector Machines cycle. Training data
is fed into the learner, which then builds a model that allows the
classiﬁer to classify unknown test data.
case with RBF or string kernels). Equipped with the support vectors, the
classiﬁer can then classify test data by calculating the closeness of the test
data to each support vector, again using the kernel.
3.3 Gaussian Processes
An alternative machine learning technique that has proven its worth in clas-
siﬁcation is Gaussian Processes [16, 76, 77]. Like Support Vector Machines,
Gaussian Processes are a supervised learning method in which the classi-
ﬁer is ﬁrst trained with labelled training data from which it then infers its
predictions.
Unlike Support Vector Machines, which divide the training data into dis-
joint groups with a hyperplane and then classify test data based on its posi-
tion relative to the hyperplane, Gaussian Processes derive a function that ﬁts
the training data and accurately predicts the classiﬁcation for an unknown
test data point. More formally, given a training data set of N observations
(x1,y1),(x2,y2),...,(xn,yn) where each xi is an input pattern vector and yi
its corresponding output, Gaussian Processes ﬁnd a function f(x) such thatCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 37
f(xn) = yn  (xn,yn)   N and that predictions can be made for unknown
values of x.
As with Support Vector Machines, there is an important distinction be-
tween regression and classiﬁcation: if the function f(x) is continuous then
it can be used for data regression, while if f(x) is discrete it can serve for
data classiﬁcation. Contrary to Support Vector Machines, however, where
regression and classiﬁcation can be treated in separate discussions, the two
are inextricably linked in Gaussian Processes. In particular, classiﬁcation in
Gaussian Processes involves ﬁrst ﬁnding a regression (continuous) function
f(x) before applying a response function [16] that returns a discrete value
for classiﬁcation.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. The ﬁrst part
argues the case for Gaussian Processes as a potentially attractive alternative
to Support Vector Machines, particularly for worm detection. This part also
outlines how Gaussian Processes ﬁt into the this dissertation. The next part
explains how Gaussian Processes work; as with Support Vector Machines this
explanation will be from a systems design perspective. The ﬁnal parts of this
section describe how squashing functions facilitate classiﬁcation, and how
kernels (like their SVM counterparts) allow Gaussian Processes to handle
complex data sets.
3.3.1 Why Gaussian Processes?
What makes Gaussian Processes an attractive machine learning technique
compared to Support Vector Machines? A shortcoming of Support Vector
Machines is that they only return a classiﬁcation, but no indication of how
conﬁdent they are that this classiﬁcation is correct. Gaussian Processes, on
the other hand, automatically return conﬁdence values as part of their result.
Conﬁdence values add another angle to the classiﬁcation that can help
reduce false alarm rates. Equipped with the conﬁdence value, the classiﬁer
can make a more informed decision, for example by accepting a proposed
classiﬁcation only if the conﬁdence value is above a certain threshold while
ﬂagging it for further inspection otherwise.CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 38
It should be noted that workarounds for calculating a conﬁdence measure
in Support Vector Machines have been proposed, for example [78]. But due
to the ad hoc nature of these methods and unlike Gaussian Processes they
do not cater for the predictive variance in the regression function.
3.3.2 How Gaussian Processes work
As mentioned at the outset of this section, Gaussian Processes map the input
training data to a function f that can make predictions for all possible input
values. But given a set of training data there is a potentially inﬁnite number
of functions that ﬁt the training data points, so which function will yield the
most accurate predictions for unknown data values?
Conceptually, the basic idea [76] is to ﬁrst narrow down the set of possible
functions to those more likely to ﬁt the data at hand, for example because
they are smoother. This ﬁltering occurs before any training data is seen
and the resulting function set is called the prior distribution; a sample is
pictured in Figure 3.7(a). The next step is to overlay the training data
points onto the prior as shown in Figure 3.7(b). Discarding the functions
that do not pass through all the training data points yields the posterior
shown in Figure 3.7(c).
In the posterior shown in Figure 3.7(c), the solid line is the mean of
the remaining (not-discarded) functions – this is the regression function f.
The shaded area stretches twice the standard deviation of a given x value
and denotes the conﬁdence value at that x – the larger the area the lower
the conﬁdence. The conﬁdence around the training data items is high, as
expected.
An issue side-stepped in the above explanation is that the prior and pos-
terior distributions consist of an inﬁnite set of (Gaussian) distributions, but
to be practically feasible the calculations must be performed in ﬁnite time.
Loosely speaking, the key concept is to group the inﬁnite set of distributions
so that they can be treated as one entity and deﬁned with a ﬁnite set of
properties. Applying this concept, a Gaussian distribution is a distribution
deﬁned by its mean and standard deviation. A Gaussian process, still looselyCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 39
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Figure 3.7: The prior (a) is a pre-selected set of functions likely to
ﬁt the task at hand. Overlaying the prior with training data points
(b), and discarding those functions that do not pass through all
training data points yields the posterior (c).CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 40
speaking, can be thought of as a group of (possibly inﬁnite) Gaussian distri-
butions, and that group can be deﬁned by the mean and standard deviation
of all the distributions.
Seen from a slightly more formal angle, a Gaussian distribution can be
viewed as a function f(x) that operates on scalar values2 x, while a Gaussian
process operates on a set of i Gaussian distributions fi(x). The mean value
of the Gaussian distribution is that of evaluating f(x) for all x; the mean
value of the Gaussian process is that of evaluating all fi(x) for all x.
  










        
Figure 3.8: Gaussian Processes can be seen as ﬁlling a long vector
where the entries hold the mean common to all Gaussian distribu-
tions in the process.
How does this help with the challenge of computing with inﬁnite prior
and posterior distribution sets in ﬁnite time? Another way to look at a
function f(x) is as a very long vector, where the indices consists of the x
values and the entries for each index x are the corresponding f(x). Figure 3.8
extends this idea to Gaussian processes: the functions f1   f3 are random
samples from the prior distribution. The crosses mark the training data
points {(1,5),(3,8),(6,7)}, with corresponding entries in the function vector.
2Or more generally, vector values for multivariate distributionsCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 41
From a Gaussian process perspective, the vector entries can be seen as
buckets to be ﬁlled with Gaussian distributions where the mean is 5 when
x = 1, 8 when x = 3, and 7 when x = 6. The distributions common in all
buckets (shaded grey) are the posterior distributions; in Figure 3.8, only f1
and f2 meet that requirement.
Gaussian processes, then, e ectively work backwards in computing the
posterior distributions by viewing the training data as the mean values com-
mon to all distributions in the posterior.
3.3.3 From regression to classiﬁcation
The previous section explained how Gaussian processes, given a training data
set, derive a function that allows predictions of unknown test data. But there
is still a missing piece to the puzzle: the output of the regression stage is a
continuous function, which can lie in the range    to  , and is therefore
unsuitable for classiﬁcation.
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Figure 3.9: The classiﬁcation function g(x) is obtained by squash-
ing y(x) through the response function  
The approach taken by Gaussian processes is to apply a response func-
tion [76]. The underlying idea is that classes are assigned numeric labels,
for example benign=0 and malicious=1, and the response function squashes
the regression from    to   to ﬁt into the range [0,1] (Figure 3.9). The
squashed result can then be used for classiﬁcation.CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 42
3.3.4 Kernel functions
Like Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes belong to the set of kernel
machines, with the kernel determining the similarity or closeness between
two data points. In the Gaussian Processes literature, kernels are commonly
referred to as covariance functions, but for consistency this dissertation will
continue to refer to them as kernel functions. The kernel heavily inﬂuences
the smoothness of the prior distributions, and as such it is a key ingredient
to the classiﬁer.
The approach taken in this dissertation is to ﬁnd the optimal kernel for
Support Vector Machines, and to use this kernel for comparison in Gaussian
Processes. The underlying rationale is that since a kernel measures similarity
between data points, for a given data type (such as network tra c) the kernel
should work equally under Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes.
For a rigourous treatment of kernel functions in Gaussian Processes, including
the conditions a function must fulﬁl to be considered a kernel, see [76].
3.4 K-nearest neighbours
K-nearest neighbours [17] is one of the simplest pattern recognition algo-
rithms that nonetheless often performs well. To classify an unknown test
data point, the K-nearest neighbour algorithm compares that test data point
to all given training data points and performs a majority vote on the classes
of the K nearest neighbours (Figure 3.10). The test data point is classiﬁed
under the class of the winner of that vote.
In contrast to Gaussian Processes, K-nearest neighbours is a classiﬁcation
algorithm by nature. Although K-nearest neighbours is a supervised learning
method, unlike Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes it defers
all calculations until classiﬁcation.
The naive implementation of the algorithm iterates over all training data
points and calculates the distance to the test data, orders the training data
points by that distance, and then casts a majority vote on the top K training
data points. While easily implemented, this implementation su ers fromCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 43

Figure 3.10: The K-nearest neighbour algorithm makes its pre-
diction by ﬁnding the K points that are closest to the point in
question (the star). It then takes a majority vote of the classes
of these K points to determine the prediction for the point in
question.
limited scalability as it grows linearly with the number of training data points.
For this reason a number of optimisations have been proposed, for example
partitioning the feature space [79].
Critical to the predication accuracy is the number of neighbours (K).
The optimal value for K depends on the type of data, although in general
increasing K should raise the accuracy by mitigating the negative impact of
noise on the classiﬁcation accuracy. On the downside, increasing K blurs the
boundaries between the classes. A common method for choosing K is cross-
validation, whereby the training data is split into an actual training data set
with the remaining data items used to validate the results. Note that for
K= 1 the algorithm degenerates to simply ﬁnding the nearest neighbour.
The K-nearest neighbour works for any types of data points, as long as a
function is available that returns the distance between two data points (for
some deﬁnition of distance). The standard distance function is the Euclidean
distance function, which also works well for multi-dimensional data points.
In this dissertation K-nearest neighbours serves two purposes. The ﬁrst
is to determine whether a simple algorithm such as K-nearest neighbours canCHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 44
be applied to a complex pattern recognition problem such as detecting worm
mutations. And the second is to see how K-nearest neighbours compares to
the (more complex) machine learning techniques of Support Vector Machines
and Gaussian Process in detecting worm mutations.
3.4.1 Properties
K-nearest neighbours o ers both positive and negative properties:
• Simplicity. Both from a conceptual and implementation point of view
the simplicity of K-nearest neighbours makes it an attractive machine
learning method.
• Incremental learning. A nice side e ect of delaying calculations to
classiﬁcation time is that K-nearest neighbours algorithm can learn
incrementally as new training data becomes available. Thus, unlike
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, it does not need to
be retrained with the entire (original plus new) training data set.
• Training data percentage sensitivity. A drawback is that classes
with a higher percentage of training data tend to dominate the predic-
tion simply by their larger presence. The dominance could be reduced
by taking into account the distances during the majority vote.
• Noise sensitivity. Another drawback is that the accuracy of K-
nearest neighbours can be severely a ected by noise or other irrelevant
features, leading to over-ﬁtting. As mentioned in the previous section
this can be counterbalanced by increasing the number of neighbours
(K), but this has the negative e ect of blurring the class boundaries.
3.5 Other machine learning techniques
What about other machine learning techniques? This section discusses some
of the other popular machine learning techniques used for classiﬁcation, and
explains why this dissertation decided not to apply them to worm detection.CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 45
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) such as Fisher’s discriminant analy-
sis [80], tries to ﬁnd a linear combination of features that separate two or more
classes. LDA projects the feature vectors down to a single dimension with a
linear discriminant function in order to classify the data. This dissertation
does not consider LDA because of known di culties with non-linear data
(such as network tra c), and because it has been shown to be outperformed
by Support Vector Machines on standard benchmarks [81].
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) is a generalisation of LDA that
dissects classes with a quadric surface, with the advantage that it does
not rely on the assumption that the covariance of all classes are identical.
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis has been shown to be outperformed by Sup-
port Vector Machines, for example in [82].
Decision tree learning [83] builds a decision tree from data by repeatedly
partitioning the input space until a node consists only of a single class. The
branches are conjunctions that lead to the classes, and classiﬁcation involves
moving down the branches until hitting a leaf node. Although decision trees
are e ective and e cient for small data sets, they do not scale well for large
data sets, winding up in complicated trees that consume large amounts of
memory. Since this dissertation expects to deal with large volumes of network
tra c data, decision trees were not further considered.
Another popular alternative classiﬁcation technique is o ered by Artiﬁcial
Neural Networks [84]. However, in recent years Gaussian Processes and Sup-
port Vector Machines have repeatedly been shown to outperform Artiﬁcial
Neural Networks [77, 85], one of the reasons being that they are less prone
to overﬁtting. Another reason is that Artiﬁcial Neural Networks are a para-
metric method, and as mentioned in Section 3.1.3, this dissertation favours
non-parametric models because of their ﬂexibility in that only a similarity
measure between objects need to be deﬁned.CHAPTER 3. MACHINE LEARNING 46
3.6 Summary
Machine learning is a sub-discipline of artiﬁcial intelligence that involves
developing algorithms that automatically recognise patterns using statistical
classiﬁcation. Examples of patterns to be recognised include ﬁngerprints,
images, handwriting, voice recordings, or as in this dissertation, worms.
This work focuses on three prominent supervised learning methods:
• Support Vector Machines learn patterns by dividing labelled train-
ing data into disjoint groups and ﬁnding the separating hyperplane that
maximises the margin between the hyperplane and the support vectors.
Equipped with the hyperplane, the classiﬁer can then label a given test
data point based on its position relative to the hyperplane.
• Gaussian Processes learn patterns by mapping the input training
data to a function that can make predictions for all possible input
values. The basic idea is to ﬁrst narrow down the set of possible func-
tions to those more likely to ﬁt the data at hand, and then overlaying
the training data points and discarding the functions that do not pass
through all training data points. Gaussian Processes are an attractive
machine learning technique since, unlike Support Vector Machines, they
return a conﬁdence value as part of their classiﬁcations.
• K-nearest neighbours is one of the simplest pattern recognition algo-
rithms that surprisingly often performs well. The K-nearest neighbour
algorithm classiﬁes an unknown test data point by calculating the dis-
tance of this point to all given training data points and performing a
majority vote on the K nearest neighbours’ classes.
The following chapter ties together this chapter and the previous chapter
by showing how machine learning can be applied to worm detection.Chapter 4
Applying machine learning to
worm detection
The last two chapters looked at intrusion detection systems and machine
learning as separate, standalone subjects. This chapter merges these two
subjects by presenting the design of an intrusion detection system that de-
tects worm mutations using machine learning.
The questions this chapter answers: (i) how to capture network tra c
accurately, (ii) how to convert the captured tra c to a format understood
by the machine learning classiﬁer, (iii) where the machine learning modules
ﬁt into the system, and (iv) where and how such a system can be deployed.
Before answering these questions, this chapter ﬁrst deﬁnes a suitable
worm model that will serve as a basis for this dissertation.
4.1 Worm model
For the purposes of this dissertation, a worm can be thought of as a stream of
binary data that consists of the following three parts, illustrated in Figure 4.1:
1. Application speciﬁc data consisting of protocol headers and other
control information required to communicate with the vulnerable ser-
vice.
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Figure 4.1: The worm model used throughout this dissertation
consists of (i) application speciﬁc data required to communicate
with the vulnerable service, (ii) exploit code that attacks the vul-
nerability and injects the malicious code, and (iii) the executable
payload which is executed upon successful inﬁltration of the target.
2. Exploit code that attacks the service by exploiting a vulnerability,
and that injects the malicious code into the application.
3. Executable payload that runs upon successful inﬁltration of the sys-
tem by the exploit code; typically, this executable contains potentially
malicious actions and necessary information on how to spread further.
With this model in mind, how can one di erentiate between two di erent
types of worms (for example Code Red vs. Slapper) and worm mutations
(such as Code Red version 1 and 1.1)?
This dissertation deﬁnes a worm mutation as a worm that carries the
same exploit but a di erent executable payload – that is, mutations of a worm
exploit the same vulnerability but execute a di erent payload on successful
inﬁltration. Figure 4.2 illustrates this di erence: the bottom of the ﬁgure
shows that a worm that is identical to another in every aspect except the
exploit code is considered a di erent worm; on the other hand, worms, that
share the same exploit like those in the centre of the ﬁgure, no matter how
much they di er otherwise, are considered to be mutations of each other.
This deﬁnition of worm mutations is based on the understanding that
worm authors tend to reﬁne either the damage that their worms cause, or
how the worms spread – both reﬁnements that will alter the executable pay-
load. For example, Code Red 1.1 reﬁned the executable payload of Code
Red 1 to ﬁnd more potential victims by improving the random IP address
generator. The application speciﬁc data, while constant, will be similar to
application speciﬁc data of legitimate software communicating with the vul-CHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 49
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Figure 4.2: This dissertation distinguishes between mutations of
the same worm and di erent worms by their exploit code. Worm
mutations share the same exploit code, while di erent types of
worm do not.
nerable service. This leaves the exploit code as (a) the most likely lowest
common denominator between worm mutations, and (b) the distinguishing
factor to legitimate tra c.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, intrusion detection systems typically iden-
tify worms by their signature, which can be thought of as a character string
or a regular expression, that is present in all mutations of the worm and not
in benign ﬂows, and as such uniquely identiﬁes the worm. The signatures in
existing intrusion detection systems typically only match part of the exploit
(if at all), plus additional code outside the exploit that matches the worm.
As such, these conventional signatures will usually not detect mutations.
Note that since this model treats worms as byte streams, the deﬁnition
of a worm mutation is a binary equivalence one. The model does not cater
for the possibility of changing the exploit code’s binary while keeping the
underlying semantics unchanged, for example by modifying the machine code
to use di erent registers or inserting NOOP instructions.CHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 50
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Figure 4.3: High level architecture of the machine learning enabled
worm detector.
4.2 Architecture
Figure 4.3 presents a high-level architecture of a machine learning enabled
worm detector, consisting of three stages: capturing tra c, converting the
tra c into a format that is readable by machine learning techniques, and
classifying the ﬂows as malicious or benign.
The rest of this chapter discusses each of these components in turn, and
then revisits the architecture with the information from these discussions.
4.3 Capturing network tra c
There are various levels at which the network tra c can be analysed, for
example, at the packet level by examining each packet individually. A dis-
advantage of examining tra c at this level is that malicious contents such as
worm exploits can easily be split up over several packets. Even when worm
authors themselves do not split their worms, if a large packet traverses a
network with a small maximum transmission size, the packet will be split
into smaller packets by routers along the way. Moreover, one of the routers
may experience congestion, causing the packets to arrive out of order. Thus
scanning at packet level is too ﬁne-grained and will potentially miss worms
spanning multiple packets.
At the other end of the analysis spectrum is application protocol-level
analysis, as is done by Bro [42], discussed in Section 2.2.2.2. Protocol level
analysers generate events based on various protocol speciﬁc data exchanges.
For example, a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) analyser could generate
an event for every HTTP GET request. The events in turn are parsed by policyCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 51
scripts that accompany the protocol analysers.
An advantage of application protocol-level analysis is the high abstraction
level it o ers, allowing decisions to be made with greater certainty. Two
problems with application protocol-level analysis are that (i) they are heavy-
weight in terms of processing due to the overhead of parsing byte streams into
state machines of those protocols, and (ii) to make the most of this setup,
protocol-level analysers for all protocols would have to be written.
A third alternative is to analyse the network at the ﬂow level. Flows are
typically deﬁned as transmission control protocol (TCP) [86] or user data-
gram protocol (UDP) [87] packet streams, where a stream is identiﬁed by the
source Internet Protocol (IP) address, source port number, the destination IP
address, and the destination port number. In addition, TCP packets include
a sequence number that determines the order in which these packets are to
be reassembled, as the TCP protocol allows packets to arrive in arbitrary
order to handle the above mentioned queuing delays at routers.
Analysing ﬂows rather than the individual packets that make up a ﬂow
ensures that worms can be scanned in their entirety. Flows can then be
treated as byte arrays for pattern recognition. Because ﬂow-level analysis
is ﬂexible and ﬁne-grained enough to allow worms to be scanned in their
entirety without incurring the overhead of parsing protocols, the machine
learning worm detector will work exclusively at the ﬂow level. The impact
of ﬂow-level analysis on real-time reassembly of these ﬂows on high speed
networks is discussed in Section 9.4 as future work.
4.3.1 A sample implementation
To help understand how ﬂows can be reassembled and scanned for signatures
concurrently, this section brieﬂy discusses an implementation of a lightweight
packet capture and ﬂow reassembly system.
The system consists of three main components: a packet capturer, a ﬂow
table, and a ﬂow analyser. The packet capturer simply takes one packet
from the wire at a time, using the the pcap [88] packet capturing library,
and adds it to the ﬂow table, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The ﬂow table isCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 52
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Figure 4.4: Individual packets are sorted into ﬂows as they arrive
on the wire.
a data structure that holds packets sorted by ﬂow. The ﬂow analyser runs
in its own thread, stepping through the ﬂow table sequentially looking for
suspicious ﬂows. In this multi-threaded architecture the ﬂow analyser works
concurrently to the packet capturer1.
The ﬂow analyser encapsulates the logic that labels ﬂows malicious or
benign – this is where the machine learning algorithm sits, which could be
modularised to allow for multiple worm detectors. The ﬂow table is imple-
mented as a hashtable to achieve lookup and insertion in constant time. The
hashtable’s key is the 5-tuple <source IP address, destination IP address,
source port, destination port, protocol> that uniquely describes a ﬂow.
The ﬂow data structure consists of two packet bu ers and a read-write
lock, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. The packets are added to the working
bu er until the ﬂow analyser arrives to inspect that ﬂow. At this point,
the read-write lock is set and from that point any incoming packets land in
the holding bu er. When the ﬂow analyser completes, the lock is released
1Note that conventional threads such as pthreads [89], are not well suited for high-rate
packet capturing, for reasons outlined in [90], which suggests Protothreads [91] as a viable
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Figure 4.5: A ﬂow consists of two packet bu ers and a read-write
lock. Maintaining a holding bu er for when the ﬂow analyser
examines the ﬂow prevents packets from being discarded.
and the packets moved from the holding bu er to the working bu er. This
structure allows packets to be examined without having to block the entire
ﬂow or dropping packets.
4.4 Feature extraction
As discussed in Section 3.1, machine learning techniques perform statistical
analysis on input data that can be captured in feature (or pattern) vectors.
A feature vector is a row of data where each column represents a speciﬁc
character in a ﬁxed alphabet. Often, however, data such as images, text, or
as in this work, network ﬂows, cannot readily be captured as feature vectors,
and features must be extracted explicitly. The remainder of this ﬁrst section
explains in greater detail why features must be extracted from network ﬂows
and then exactly how features are extracted.
4.4.1 Why features must be extracted
To better understand why features must be extracted, consider a case insen-
sitive feature vector that represents words by using 26 columns, one for each
letter in the alphabet. The value held in each column denotes the presence
(1) or absence (0) of that letter in the word. The word ELVIS, for example,
would then be represented by the feature vector shown in Figure 4.6(a).
A shortcoming of this simple representation is that any permutation of theCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 54
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(c) Bi-gram vector for LIVES
Figure 4.6: Feature vectors representing the words ELVIS and
LIVES using uni-grams, and bi-grams.
word ELVIS would produce the same feature vector; for instance, LIVES and
LEVIS both collide as feature vectors with ELVIS. To overcome this problem,
one can use a feature vector that represents all possible combinations of two
characters, from AA to ZZ. Figures 4.6(b) and 4.6(c) show that the feature
vectors for ELVIS and LIVES are now di erent. Feature vectors with one
character per entry are called uni-grams, those with two characters are called
bi-grams, and the generalisation to n characters per entry are called n-grams.
The more characters one combines per entry in the feature vector, the
more precisely the word is represented, but the greater also the number of
columns. In the case of tri-grams, for example, ELVIS would be represented
by entries at ELV, LVI, VIS. Using 5-grams, the entire word can be represented
in one column of the feature vector, albeit at the cost of 265 columns in the
feature vector. In general, the number of columns grows exponentially with
n.
In addition to marking the presence or absence of character combinations,
one can keep frequency counts of these combinations in the feature vectorCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 55
columns. This technique is known as n-gram extraction. The frequency
counts can be normalised (scaled) to the total count to measure the relative
probability of a feature vector. Whether normalised feature vectors can bet-
ter detect worm mutations than unnormalised (that is, with raw frequency
counts) feature vectors is investigated in Section 5.3.3.2.
One would expect that, given inﬁnite memory and processing time, the
higher the value of n, the more precise the information obtained. This,
however, is not the case. Essentially, the probability at which individual n-
grams occur is estimated by measuring their relative frequencies. Neverthe-
less, there will almost always be situations where one encounters an n-gram
that has not been seen before. Using frequency counts, this n-gram would
be estimated at a nonzero probability, even though its relative probability is
zero, a problem known as the zero frequency problem [92].
Lower values of n reduce the zero frequency problem. For example, using
5-grams an unlikely word such as SLIVE would receive a non-zero probability
even though it is improbable that it will reoccur. Using 3-grams, however,
SLIVE would occupy (among others) the features SLI and IVE, which are
more likely to occur again in words such as SLIDE and HIVE.
Section 5.1.3 evaluates the trade-o s involved in selecting the value of n
and how it impacts worm detection.
4.4.2 Implementing n-gram extraction
Since worms are often transmitted in the form of binary executables, the full
byte range is used as the alphabet. That is, rather than using just letters A
to Z or even displayable ASCII characters, the byte values 0 to 255 are used,
and hence no distinction between displayable and non-displayable characters
is made.
The fundamental data structure in the n-gram extractor implementation
is an integer array of frequency counts. The length of this array is dependent
on the n-gram size, requiring 256n elements, and is practically feasible only
for small values of n. Assuming 4-byte integers, frequency arrays for n-grams
sizes 1, 2, 3, and 4 consume 1 KB, 256 KB, 64 MB, and 16 GB of memoryCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 56
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Figure 4.7: Feature extraction using a sliding window and bi-gram
frequency table.
respectively. For n-gram sizes of 4 and above, these frequency tables would
need to be implemented using data-structures such as hashtables or Bloom
ﬁlters [93] to be practically feasible. Alternatively, n-grams for higher values
could be estimated by, for example, using the 2v-gram [52] technique.
The frequency table is populated by a sliding window in the captured ﬂow.
At each position of the sliding window, its value is read and the corresponding
count incremented in frequency table entry, as shown in Figure 4.7. Thus
the processing cost of n-gram extraction grows linearly with the ﬂow size.
4.5 Machine learning classiﬁers
The previous section explained how to transform the network data into a form
that is readable by machine learning algorithms by extracting n-gram feature
vectors. This section now explains where the machine learning algorithms ﬁt
into the picture, and how they detect worms by using feature vectors.
The machine learning algorithms operate in two phases: a training phase
and a prediction phase, as shown in Figure 4.8. In the training phase, the
machine learning algorithms are supplied with a set of ﬂows that are marked
either malicious or benign, depending on whether they contain a worm. Con-
ceptually, the training phase then derives a pattern that distinguishes mali-CHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 57
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Figure 4.8: Machine learning algorithms train classiﬁers to distin-
guish between malicious and benign ﬂows.
cious and benign ﬂows. For example, for Support Vector Machines this pat-
tern consists of the support vectors that deﬁne the separating hyperplane, as
covered in Section 3.2.2.
The product of the training phase is a machine learning classiﬁer capable
of labelling unknown ﬂows as malicious or benign. In a production envi-
ronment, the training phase may be performed o ine, while the prediction
phase classiﬁes live ﬂows as they arrive on the wire.
4.6 Architecture revisited
Figure 4.9 summarises the stages involved in both the training and classiﬁ-
cation phases. The training phase captures network tra c at the ﬂow level,
extracts feature vectors using n-grams and then implicitly derives a pattern
to distinguish between malicious and benign feature vectors.
Similarly, in the classiﬁcation stage, which is performed online, featureCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 58
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(b) Classiﬁcation phase
Figure 4.9: Stages involved in the training and classiﬁcation
phases.
vectors are extracted from captured ﬂows. The classiﬁer then uses informa-
tion from the training phase to classify feature vectors.
4.7 Deployment
Network intrusion detection systems are typically deployed behind company
ﬁrewalls, acting as a second line of defence for the local area network, as
shown in Figure 4.10. Installing the intrusion detection system behind the
ﬁrewall makes sense. The ﬁrewall’s job is to block unwanted tra c, typically
by disabling tra c to ports that are known to be out of service or that are
intended for internal tra c only. Since the data blocked by the ﬁrewall is
unwanted, there is no point to load this tra c onto the intrusion detection
system since it would only needlessly increase its workload.
Where does the machine learning worm detector ﬁt into the picture? It
could be deployed (a) as a module injected into an existing network intrusionCHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 59
        
   
             
        
Figure 4.10: Intrusion detection systems are typically deployed
behind an organisation’s ﬁrewall and provide the second line of
defence to all hosts on the local area network.
detection system such as Snort or Bro, (b) as a standalone system, or (c) in
parallel to other intrusion detection systems, working together for example
with majority voting. To keep the worm detector independent of the con-
straints and weaknesses of other intrusion detection systems, this dissertation
builds the worm detector as a standalone unit.
In advanced conﬁgurations the ﬁrewall and network intrusion detection
system work together as a team. In such conﬁgurations the network intrusion
detection system sends rules to the ﬁrewall upon detecting malicious tra c.
To keep the worm detector simple, this dissertation does not add co-operation
with ﬁrewalls to its worm detector.
4.8 Summary
This chapter described how machine learning techniques can be applied to
detect worm mutations:
• Worm model. The worm model used in this dissertation and deﬁned
in this chapter is a stream of binary data that consists of three parts:
application-speciﬁc data, an exploit code, and an executable payload.CHAPTER 4. APPLYING ML TO WORM DETECTION 60
A worm mutation is as a worm that exploits the same vulnerability as
the original worm, but executes a di erent payload on inﬁltration.
• Capturing network tra c. Network tra c is captured at the ﬂow
level rather than at the packet level so that worms spanning multiple
packets can be scanned for in their entirety.
• Feature extraction is performed on captured ﬂows to create feature
vectors that the machine learning algorithms can understand. The
feature vectors are n-grams, with optimal value of n to be determined
in later chapters.
• Machine learning algorithms operate in two phases. In the training
phase, the machine learning algorithm is supplied with a set of ﬂows
that are labelled as either malicious or benign from which it implicitly
deduces a distinguishing pattern. The product of the training phase is
a classiﬁer capable of classifying unknown ﬂows.
• Deployment of the worm detector is intended behind company ﬁre-
walls, acting as a second line of defence for the local area network.
This chapter set the scene for the following chapters, which investigate
whether the machine-learning enabled worm detector introduced in this chap-
ter can successfully detect worm mutations.Chapter 5
Support Vector Machines for
worm detection
The previous chapter introduced an architecture that uses machine learning
to detect worm mutations. This chapter puts this architecture to the test.
Speciﬁcally, this chapter investigates whether Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) are suitable for detecting worm mutations. It compares the e cacy
of various SVM conﬁgurations and associated kernel functions in classifying
worm mutations. This chapter will show that Support Vector Machines are
suited for detecting mutations of known worms, and that the optimal con-
ﬁguration is a linear kernel with unnormalised bi-gram frequency counts as
input.
5.1 Experiment design
The design of this chapter’s experiments fall into three parts: (i) the worm
mutations used for training and test data, (ii) the feature extraction from
network ﬂows, and (iii) ﬁnding the optimal conﬁguration of the Support
Vector Machine.
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Figure 5.1: Synthetic ﬂows. Malicious ﬂows consist of random
data but contain the worms signature at an arbitrary position,
whereas benign ﬂows are just random data.
5.1.1 Synthetic mutations
A wide spectrum of training data is critical to the SVM’s success – the
wider the spectrum, the more likely the training phase can detect a pattern
common to the worm mutations. However, for a thorough investigation the
spectrum of available worm mutations is too narrow, which is why the exper-
iments in this chapter rely on synthetically generated ﬂows. By synthetically
generating ﬂows, the experiments gain not just control over the number of
mutations, but also their size and the contents of their payload.
The synthetic ﬂows will either be malicious or benign, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.1. Malicious ﬂows are where the worm’s signature has been injected
into the random data, e ectively simulating a worm mutation. Recall from
the worm model deﬁnition in Section 4.1 that a signature is a string or reg-
ular expression that identiﬁes the worm. To be consistent with this worm
model, the signatures injected into the ﬂows are part of the exploit code.
Benign ﬂows are simply random data simulating normal tra c.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 63
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Figure 5.2: Synthetic worms loosely based on the Slapper worm
consist of random-sized chunks of SSL traces used as padding.
The challenge in using random padding lies in ﬁnding a random distri-
bution that realistically emulates normal tra c. To overcome this problem,
the synthetic ﬂows are padded with randomly selected chunks of benign ﬂow
traces. To verify this approach, the classiﬁer’s performance on ﬂows using
padding generated with a uniform random number generator and padding
generated from benign ﬂow traces are compared.
Key to the validity of this chapter’s experiments is that although the
signature of a synthetically generated worm is known, this information is not
passed on to the SVM. The Support Vector Machine is only told whether the
ﬂow is benign or malicious, and must deduce the signature itself.
5.1.1.1 Synthetic Slapper worm
To make the synthetic ﬂows realistic, the injected worm signature is loosely
based on the Slapper [31] worm, which has a widely publicised and fairly
simple signature. The Slapper worm allows the attacker to run arbitrary and
potentially malicious code on the infected host before building a botnet1 of all
infected hosts. The Slapper worm exploited an OpenSSL [32] vulnerability
in older versions of the Apache web server, and has a signature that carries
1A botnet is a network of infected hosts that can be remote controlled to perform
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Figure 5.3: Continuous, split, and jumbled signatures.
the string TERM=xterm2. The synthetic ﬂows were generated from randomly
selected benign SSL traces, with the string TERM=xterm injected into the
malicious ﬂows (Figure 5.2).
5.1.1.2 Continuous, split, and jumbled signatures
Thus far this chapter has assumed that all signatures are continuous – a single
block of data as shown at the top of Figure 5.3(a). Given that continuous
data can be easily matched in network ﬂows, worm authors have attempted
to distort their worms to escape detection.
The easiest way to distort the worm is by splitting the continuous blocks
at arbitrary locations, resulting in split signatures as shown in Figure 5.3(b).
A further reﬁnement is to randomly rearrange the split blocks, leaving a
jumbled signature as depicted in Figure 5.3(c).
2Note that this is an oversimpliﬁed version of the signature used by Snort and Bro.
Both additionally consider some of Slapper’s other actions, such as probing servers and
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5.1.1.3 Corrupted signatures
How does the classiﬁer handle corrupted signatures? To answer this question,
a test set was created containing corrupted (or dirty) signatures. To create
this test set, parts of the signatures in the test set were randomly corrupted
to various degrees using a uniform random number generator. The classiﬁer’s
accuracy distinguishing malicious from benign ﬂows was then observed.
The detector sits at the TCP layer of the network stack, meaning it deals
with fully reassembled TCP ﬂow payloads and therefore should not have
to worry about data corruption caused by communication errors, such as
dropped, reordered, or corrupted packets. Nonetheless there are two good
reasons to investigate how the classiﬁer copes with corrupted signatures.
First, polymorphic worms often mutate themselves by corrupting their
signatures. Recall that polymorphic worms are worms that try to evade
detection by mutating themselves from hop to hop as they traverse the net-
work. Understanding, then, how the classiﬁers cope with corrupted signa-
tures would give insight as to how well they would be able to detect poly-
morphic worms.
And second, since a corrupted signature is by deﬁnition a worm mutation,
investigating corrupted signatures gives further insight into how robust the
classiﬁers are in detecting worm mutations.
5.1.2 Kernel conﬁguration
The choice of kernel is arguably the most important Support Vector Ma-
chine parameter. Section 3.2.3 selected three candidate kernels to test: the
linear kernel, the radial basis function (RBF) kernel, and the string kernel.
Table 5.1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of these kernels.
Within each kernel, optimal values for the following parameters need to
be determined:
• The linear kernel has only a single parameter that can be tuned –
the C value. This parameter determines the softness of the margin
classes. The softer the margin, the more erroneously placed data pointsCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 66
Kernel Advantages Disadvantages
Linear • simplest kernel • works only in input space
• only one hyperparameter
RBF • good general performance • tune two hyperparameters
• implicitly maps data to vs. only one for linear
higher dimension
String • optimised for string matching • slow compared to linear
and RBF
Table 5.1: Comparison of the linear, radial basis function (RBF),
and string kernels.
it tolerates. Essentially it is the trade-o  between ﬁtting the training
data and maximising the margin.
• There are two parameters that can be tuned in RBF kernels: C and
gamma. The RBF’s C parameters serves the same purpose as the linear
kernel’s. The gamma value controls the width of the RBF kernel, and
hence the smoothness of the RBF.
• In the string kernel the two key parameters are the substring length,
and whether to consider all lengths up to the substring length or just the
given length itself. The e ect of varying the substring length relative
to the signature length for both ﬁxed and variable-length strings is
investigated.
After determining optimal parameter values for the individual kernels,
their performance is compared in terms of classiﬁcation accuracy, training
time, and prediction time. Once these experiments yield an optimal kernel,
the optimal n-gram size and whether normalising extracted features improves
classiﬁer performance is investigated.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 67
5.1.3 Feature extraction
As discussed in Section 4.4, feature extraction for SVMs involves extracting
n-gram frequency counts from the ﬂow payloads. One of this chapter’s aims
is to investigate the trade-o s involved in selecting the value of n.
Since this work’s ultimate goal is to detect worms in a real-life environ-
ment – facing limited memory and processing power – this work restricts
itself to 1-, 2-, and 3-grams, consuming 1 KB, 256 KB, 64 MB respectively3.
Higher values of n and alternative representations are picked up again in
future work (Section 9.3).
Of the three candidate kernels introduced in Section 3.2.3, only the lin-
ear and RBF kernel require n-gram extraction since both require vectors as
inputs, whereas the string kernel works with character (byte) strings natively.
5.1.4 Training data size
As mentioned previously, a classiﬁer’s accuracy can be greatly a ected by
the spectrum of the training data. By employing synthetic worms the exper-
iments are not limited by the number of available worm mutations, which
leads to the question how sensitive the classiﬁer accuracy really is to the
training data spectrum.
To answer this question, the experiments gauge the training data size to
test the impact on classiﬁer accuracy. Ideally the classiﬁer should demon-
strate good accuracy even for small training data sets, as the number of
available worm mutations to serve as training data in the wild will be lim-
ited.
5.1.5 Data-to-signature ratio
The worm model in Section 4.1 deﬁned a worm mutation as a worm that
carries a di erent executable payload but uses the same exploit to gain access
into the remote system. But the executable payload is not limited to be the
same size as that carried by the original worm, which means that mutations
3These size values are calculated assuming 4-byte integersCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 68
Worm Payload Signature Ratio
(bytes) (bytes)
Code Red 4039 396 9:1
Slammer 404 16 24:1
Witty 1184 64 18:1
Distcc 1740 307 6:1
Minishare 8600 2252 4:1
Table 5.2: Approximate data-to-signature ratios for past worms.
The values for Distcc and Minishare are based on the average sizes
of the mutations generated in Chapter 7.
of the same worm may have di erent sizes. Rather than compare worm
mutations in terms of their absolute size, this dissertation compares worms
based on the amount of total data relative to the size of exploit code – the
data-to-signature ratio.
Worm mutations in the real world thus have di erent data-to-signature
ratios, and so the experiments investigate the impact of mixed data-to-
signature ratios in training and test data sets on classiﬁer accuracy. The
expected result is lower accuracy for higher ratios as the large amounts of
padding data swamp the signature.
Table 5.2 shows approximate data-to-signature ratios for the Code Red [6],
Slammer [8], Witty [37], Distcc [94] and Minishare [95] worms. All the worms
have a data-to-signature below 25:1; this chapter will use this ﬁgure as a
yardstick when evaluating the performance of the classiﬁer.
5.1.6 False alarm rates
Thus far, accuracy served as the measure of how well ﬂows are classiﬁed.
While accuracy is an intuitive measure, it does not tell the whole story. In
intrusion detection, the false alarm rate is important, since falsely classifying
ﬂows as malicious (false positive) means that legitimate tra c is blocked.
Conversely, falsely classifying ﬂows as benign (false negative) means thatCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 69
worms pass undetected.
Receiver operator characteristics (ROC) [96] curve analysis presents a
way of quantifying the trade-o  between the detection rate and the false
alarm rate. ROC curves have their roots in signal detection and medical
decision-making, and have recently become a popular way of analysing ma-
chine learning classiﬁers. Appendix B provides a detailed overview of ROC
curve analysis.
The ROC curve for a classiﬁer is generated by plotting the true positive
rate versus the false positive rate at various conﬁdence intervals. The true
positive rate is calculated by dividing the number of true positives by the
total number of positives; similarly the false positive rate is calculated by
dividing the number of false positives by the total number of negatives. A
single classiﬁcation will produce a single point in the ROC space and a curve
is obtained by varying the classiﬁer’s conﬁdence (see also Appendix B).
The performance metric that can be obtained from these curves is the
total area under the curve (AUC) [97]. The larger the area, the better the
classiﬁer.
5.2 Experimental setup
All experiments were performed on an Intel Xeon with a 2.40GHz CPU and
1GB of RAM. Libsvm [98] version 1.8 was used as the Support Vector Ma-
chine implementation for linear and RBF kernels, and libs [99] version 1.3, a
libsvm modiﬁcation, was used for string kernels.
As a baseline for each experiment, a training set of 100 ﬂows, half ma-
licious and benign, was used. The implications of this training data size is
investigated in Section 5.3.4 below. A test set of size 1000, again half mali-
cious and half benign ﬂows was used; each experiment was repeated 50 times4
with di erent data sets to obtain averages and standard deviations.
Note that the equal ratio of malicious to benign ﬂows in the test set is
4The number of iterations (repeats) was investigated, showing that the accuracy levels
stabilised at 50 iterations.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 70
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Figure 5.4: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ratios
for ﬂows padded with random and SSL data.
not representative of real network tra c, where the proportion of benign
ﬂows is likely to be much higher. However, the aim of the experiments is to
determine with which accuracy the classiﬁer can classify unknown network
ﬂows, and for an unbiased result there should be an equal probability that it
receives either a malicious or a benign ﬂow.
5.3 Analysis
This section presents the results of the experiments described in the previous
section.
5.3.1 Synthetic mutation format
Figure 5.4 shows the prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ratios
for ﬂows padded with random and SSL data. As expected, it is much harder
to distinguish between malicious and benign worms when padded with SSL
data. A likely explanation is that the SSL padding tends to have large chunks
repeated among all ﬂows, thereby diluting the signature. Using uniformCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 71
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Figure 5.5: Prediction accuracy at various C values using the linear
kernel and a data-to-signature ratio of 100 : 1.
random data as padding, on the other hand, highlights the signature.
Since SSL padded ﬂows are both more realistic and constitute a harder
problem, henceforth only results for SSL padded data are shown.
5.3.2 Choosing the optimal kernel
This section answers the question as to which is the optimal kernel for the
SVM. It does so by ﬁrst examining each of the linear, RBF, and string ker-
nel in turn to ﬁnd each kernel’s optimal conﬁguration before comparing the
kernels themselves.
5.3.2.1 Conﬁguring the linear kernel
The e ect of varying the C parameter was investigated by performing a 10-
fold cross validation. A dataset of 1000 entries was split into 10 equal parts,
of which 1 was used to train the classiﬁer and the other 9 to test it. This
was repeated with a range of C values.
As the graph in Figure 5.5 shows, altering the C value did not a ect
the classiﬁer’s performance; henceforth Libsvm’s default C value of 1 will beCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 72
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Figure 5.6: RBF kernel grid search plotting gamma against C.
used. The results indicate that the data classes are totally linearly separable.
5.3.2.2 Conﬁguring the RBF kernel
A grid-based cross validation was performed to determine the optimal pa-
rameter values for the training data. That is, an exhaustive range of C and
gamma combinations were tested, each time using a 10-fold cross validation
as used in previous case with the linear kernel’s C value. Libsvm’s [98] grid.py
script was used to perform this cross-validation.
Figure 5.6 shows results obtained from this grid search using a data set
with a data-to-signature ratio of 25:1, with C ranging from 20 to 220 and
gamma ranging from 20 to 2 20. All points that achieved 100% accuracy are
optimal parameter combinations for the RBF kernel; henceforth a parameter
combination of C= 24 and gamma= 2 14 will be used.
5.3.2.3 Conﬁguring the string kernel
Figure 5.7 shows the e ect of varying the substring length relative to the
signature length for both ﬁxed and variable-length strings. The results show
that ﬁxed length substrings and variable length substrings achieve similarCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 73
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Figure 5.7: String kernel accuracy at various string-length to
signature-length ratios comparing ﬁxed and variable length strings.
The data-to-signature ratio was 100:1.
prediction accuracies, with the performance peaking at a string-to-signature
ratio of approximately 0.5. Given the synthetic Slapper’s 10 character signa-
ture, this corresponds to a substring length of 5.
Although ﬁxed and variable length substrings achieve comparable lev-
els of accuracy, the processing time with variable-length strings is orders of
magnitude greater than using ﬁxed-length strings, due to the number of sub-
strings increasing exponentially when considering all possible substrings up
to a certain length rather than just the substring length itself.
Based on the above ﬁndings the optimal string kernel conﬁguration – and
the one used henceforth – is a ﬁxed length substring to signature ratio of 0.5.
5.3.2.4 Comparing prediction accuracy
Now that the the optimal parameter settings for the individual kernels has
been found, their classiﬁcation accuracy can be compared. The graph in
Figure 5.8 shows that all three kernels show similar accuracies. By a small
margin the string kernel exhibits the best accuracy, closely followed by theCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 74
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Figure 5.8: The prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature
ratios for the linear, RBF, and string kernel.
linear kernel, and ﬁnally the RBF kernel. The accuracy trails o  at 50% since
at this point the classiﬁer is randomly guessing whether a ﬂow is malicious
or benign, and hence is only as accurate as ﬂipping a coin.
Since the results show no clear winner in accuracy, the performance in
training and prediction times are compared next.
5.3.2.5 Comparing training time
The graph in Figure 5.9 compares the time taken to train the classiﬁer. As
expected, the time taken increases with data-to-signature ratio due to the
increase in total data. The results show that training SVMs using linear and
RBF kernels is considerably quicker than training with a string kernel.
5.3.2.6 Comparing prediction time
Arguably, the training time is not the key performance measure, since one can
train classiﬁers o ine; prediction (classiﬁcation), on the other hand, happens
online and is thus pivotal in the choice of kernel. Figure 5.10 shows the time
taken to predict a single ﬂow’s class. As was the case with training time, theCHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 75
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Figure 5.9: Time taken to train the linear, RBF, and string kernel.
This is the time for a single ﬂow, and must be multiplied by the
training data size for an estimate of the total training time.
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Figure 5.10: Time taken to predict a ﬂow’s class using the linear,
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string kernel’s prediction time is between one and two orders of magnitude
higher than for the linear and RBF kernels.
5.3.2.7 Summary
Which kernel is best? The string kernel proved only marginally more accurate
than its competitors, leaving classiﬁcation time as the tie breaker. This takes
the string kernel out of the race since it is much slower in both training
and classiﬁcation, and leaves only the linear and RBF kernel. Since the
RBF kernel is sensitive to it’s parameter values (C and gamma) and is more
complex than the linear kernel, the linear kernel was selected as the optimal
kernel for this scenario.
5.3.3 Feature extraction
Having established the linear kernel as the kernel of choice, the next step
is to examine the other factors that a ect a classiﬁer’s performance. This
section ﬁnds the optimal n-gram size, and determines whether normalising
the frequency count improves accuracy.
5.3.3.1 Optimal n-gram size
The graph in Figure 5.11 shows the prediction accuracy for uni-grams, bi-
grams and tri-grams (using a linear kernel). It illustrates that prediction
accuracy increases with higher values of n, as expected. Using tri-grams,
all ﬂows at a data-to-signature ratio of approximately 12:1, up to a data-to-
signature ratio of 100:1 are classiﬁed with 90% accuracy.
Unsurprisingly, uni-grams perform considerably worse than bi-grams and
tri-grams. The accuracy gain of tri-grams over bi-grams is negligible, which
means the best choice for this scenario is to use the smaller of the two for
performance reasons.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 77
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Figure 5.11: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ra-
tios for uni-grams, bi-grams and tri-grams.
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Figure 5.12: Prediction accuracy versus data-to-signature ratios
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Figure 5.13: The e ect of training data size on prediction accuracy
for various data-to-signature ratios.
5.3.3.2 Impact of normalising frequency counts
The graph in Figure 5.12 compares the accuracy of unnormalised versus
normalised frequency counts. Normalising improves accuracy as expected,
but only marginally so. Since normalising comes at a great computational
cost and with hardly noticeable accuracy gains, all further experiments are
conducted with unnormalised feature vectors.
5.3.4 Training data size
The graph in Figure 5.13 shows how accuracy varies with training data size.
As anticipated, the accuracy increases with training data size: the larger
the training data size, the higher the chance of the worm’s distinguishing
signature surfacing as the common pattern.
The results are highly encouraging. As shown in Table 5.2, worms tend
to have a data-to-signature lower than 25:1, for which the classiﬁer achieves
above 90% accuracy even for the smallest training data size. Accuracy climbs
with increasing training data size, reaching 100% for training data sizes of
100 and above.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 79
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Figure 5.14: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ra-
tios for di erent synthetic worm models.
Regrettably, in a real-life setting, one cannot pick the training data size
as the number of available traces is constrained5. However, this information
can be used to guarantee certain levels of accuracy. Consider as an example,
that an accuracy of at least 90% needs to be achieved and that ﬂows with
a data-to-signature ratio of 100 are used. This graph can then be used to
determine that a training data size of 100 is required to attain the desired
accuracy level.
5.3.5 Continuous, split, and jumbled signatures
The graph in Figure 5.14 shows the prediction accuracy for the di erent
signature classes, where the classiﬁer was trained solely with continuous sig-
natures. The graph reveals that the classiﬁer is still able to detect distorted
signatures, even when the signature is split or jumbled, albeit at a slight cost
of accuracy. Interestingly, split and jumbled signatures are recognised with
near identical accuracy, showing that the classiﬁer is equally robust to the
5Chapter 7 suggests a workaround of this constraint by generating worm mutations
automatically from a given source worm.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 80
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Figure 5.15: Prediction accuracy at various degrees of signature
corruption. Data-to-signature ratio is 25:1.
location and order of the worm signature.
Unlike jumbled signatures, which consist of split signature fragments that
have been reordered, jumbled with overlapping signatures do not respect
other signature fragments’ boundaries, and hence overlapping may occur.
This explains the bell shape of its graph. For small data-to-signature ra-
tios, the chances of overlapping fragments is signiﬁcantly higher, thereby
corrupting the signature’s characters. This is conﬁrmed by the relatively
poor accuracy for data-to-signature ratios of less than 10. Beyond that size
overlapping is mitigated, and the accuracy curve eventually approaches that
of split and jumbled signatures.
5.3.6 Corrupted signatures
Figure 5.15 plots accuracy against various degrees of corruption and shows
that the classiﬁer remains reasonably accurate up to 10% corruption, after
which it declines steeply. These results are encouraging since they show that
the classiﬁers do not fail abruptly when a signature is corrupted, hinting at
resilience to polymorphic worms.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 81
5.3.7 Mixed data-to-signature ratios
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Figure 5.16: Prediction accuracy at various data-to-signature ra-
tios comparing classiﬁers trained and tested with a single data-to-
signature ratio and mixed data-to-signature ratio.
The graph in Figure 5.16 compares uniform with mixed data-to-signature
ratios. The mixed data-to-signature ratios were normally distributed so that
in each comparison, the mean of the mixed data-to-signature ratios was set
equal to the corresponding uniform data-to-signature ratio. The standard
deviation for the mixed data-to-signature ratios is 20 for this graph6.
The results indicate that the classiﬁcation accuracy for mixed data-to-
signature ratios is lower than for data sets with uniform data-to-signature ra-
tios. Classiﬁers can cope better with mixed data-to-signature ratios for data
sets with low data-to-signature ratios (such as 25:1), but are more severely
a ected for higher data-to-signature ratios (such as 100:1 and 200:1). This is
good news given that worms typically have data-to-signatures less than 25:1,
as shown in Table 5.2.
A likely explanation is o ered by the way n-gram counts are extracted
6Standard deviations in the range 1 to 20 were tested; the trend was that accuracy
decreases with increasing standard deviation, as expected.CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 82
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Figure 5.17: ROC curve showing the trade-o  between true and
false positive rates for various data-to-signature ratios.
from ﬂows. By deﬁnition, ﬂows with a higher data-to-signature ratio contain
more application speciﬁc data and executable payload, which the machine
learning classiﬁer treats as noise. Mixed data-to-signature ratios may there-
fore dilute the signal (signature relative to data), making it harder for the
classiﬁer to spot the signature.
5.3.8 False alarms
The graph in Figure 5.17 shows how the AUC decreases for increasing data-
to-signature ratios, as expected. Note that the AUC should never be less
than 0.5 since the diagonal line joining co-ordinates (0,0) and (0,1) signals
random guessing by the classiﬁer. The conﬁdence values were obtained by
calculating the distance to the hyperplane [78].
5.4 Summary
This chapter tested the suitability of Support Vector Machines for detecting
worm mutations, with encouraging results:CHAPTER 5. SVMS FOR WORM DETECTION 83
• High accuracy for typical worm data-to-signature-ratios. Worms
typically have data-to-signature ratios below 25:1, and for these ratios
the classiﬁer consistently achieved very high accuracy.
• Choice of the linear kernel as the optimal kernel. Although all
three kernels (linear, RBF, and string) demonstrated similar accuracies,
the linear kernel and RBF kernels clearly outperformed the string kernel
on training and classiﬁcation time. The tie between the linear and RBF
kernels was ultimately decided in favour of the linear kernel due to its
simplicity.
• Choice of bi-gram feature vectors. Bi-gram feature vectors yielded
the best accuracy-performance trade-o , clearly outperforming uni-
grams on accuracy while closely matching the accuracy of tri-grams;
at the same time bi-grams occupy signiﬁcantly less memory than tri-
grams.
• Choice of unnormalised feature vectors. Normalising the fre-
quency counts improves accuracy only marginally but at the cost of
signiﬁcantly increasing training and prediction times.
• Resilience to signature distortions. SVMs demonstrated resilience
to split and jumbled signature mutations. SVMs also demonstrated
limited resilience to signature corruption, with accuracy hardly a ected
until 10% corruption.
• Resilience to mixed data-to-signature ratios. Mixed data-to-
signature ratios reduce the accuracy only to minor degree for small
data-to-signature ratios.
• False alarm rates. Receiver operator characteristics graphs conﬁrm
that the false alarm rates for low data-to-signature ratios is lower than
for high data-to-signature ratios.
The following chapter compares these results with two alternative ma-
chine learning techniques: Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours.Chapter 6
Alternative machine learning
methods
The experiments in the previous chapter demonstrated that Support Vector
Machines can successfully detect worm mutations. Nevertheless, Support
Vector Machines exhibit some weaknesses, and this chapter explores whether
alternative machine learning techniques can match, or surpass, the perfor-
mance of Support Vector Machines.
One such weakness of Support Vector Machines, already alluded to in
Section 3.3.1, is that they do not return any measure of conﬁdence with their
prediction; the only way to obtain such a conﬁdence measure is with ad-hoc
workarounds such as calculating the distance to the hyperplane. Without
a conﬁdence measure, the worm detector has no chance to second-guess or
override the prediction in uncertain cases.
Another weakness is that Support Vector Machines are natively binary
classiﬁers, but in practice it is often necessary to distinguish between more
than two classes. So far this dissertation was content with a binary classiﬁer
that is trained with a single worm and can predict whether a ﬂow carries
mutations of that speciﬁc worm. To extend the classiﬁer to support multi-
ple worms, each worm would have to be assigned its own class, something
Support Vector Machines do not natively support. Workarounds have been
proposed, such as cascading multiple binary classiﬁers in one versus rest [56]
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fashion. For a comparison of methods to add multi-class classiﬁcation to
Support Vector Machines, see [100].
In light of these weaknesses, are there better alternatives to Support Vec-
tor Machines to detect worm mutations? This chapter looks at two candi-
dates introduced in Chapter 3 and compares their performance to Support
Vector Machines:
• Gaussian Processes [16] return conﬁdence values with their predictions,
and this chapter investigates whether these values could help reduce
false alarm rates relative to Support Vector Machines without sacriﬁc-
ing speed. Gaussian Processes also natively support multiple classes.
• K-nearest neighbour [17] is a simple and intuitive algorithm, and this
chapter explores whether K-nearest neighbours can match the level
of accuracy of Support Vector Machines. Like Gaussian Processes,
K-nearest neighbours natively supports multiple classes, though like
Support Vector Machines it does not return conﬁdence values.
Table 6.1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the three machine
learning techniques investigated in this chapter.
6.1 Experiment design
This section describes in-turn the conﬁgurations and experimental setup
of Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes and K-nearest neighbours
methods compared in this chapter’s experiments.
6.1.1 Support Vector Machines
The experiments will use the optimal Support Vector Machine conﬁgura-
tion established in the previous chapter, namely a linear kernel using unnor-
malised bi-gram feature vectors.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 86
Method Advantages Disadvantages
SVM • previous chapter demonstrated • no conﬁdence value
suitable to detect worm mutations • multiple classes not
• highly optimised implementations natively supported
available
GP • returns conﬁdence value • implementations
• multi-class support not optimised
KNN • simple and intuitive algorithm • no conﬁdence value
• multi-class support • slow for large training
• supports incremental learning data sizes
Table 6.1: Advantages and disadvantages of Support Vector Ma-
chines, Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours.
6.1.2 Gaussian Processes
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, a shortcoming of Support Vector
Machines is that they do not return a conﬁdence value with their predictions,
while Gaussian Processes return such conﬁdence values as part of their results
automatically. Since conﬁdence values could be used to reduce the number
of false alarms, the aim is to show how e ective Gaussian Processes are in
detecting worm mutations.
Like Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes are kernel machines,
with the kernel measuring the similarity between two points. Section 5.3.2
of the previous chapter showed that the linear kernel was the optimal kernel
for Support Vector Machines, implying that the data (the worm ﬂows) are
linearly separable. Based on this ﬁnding, the experiments in this chapter will
employ the linear kernel for Gaussian Processes as well. Besides the kernel
there are no further conﬁguration parameters for Gaussian Processes.
For the experiments in this work the Matlab implementation for the Gaus-
sian Processes classiﬁer in [101] was ported to C so that it can be plugged
into the architecture described in Section 4.2. The implementation stays true
to the original Matlab implementation by using matrices and associated op-CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 87
erations; the C port uses the Gnu Scientiﬁc Library (GSL) [102] to handle
matrix operations. The implementation was validated by comparing results
for a wide range of input test data with the original Matlab implementation.
6.1.3 K-nearest neighbours
K-nearest neighbours is arguably the most straightforward supervised ma-
chine learning algorithm. Like Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Pro-
cesses, K-nearest neighbours is a kernel machine. For the same reasons as
Gaussian Processes – the previous chapter established the data as linearly
separable and the linear kernel as the optimal kernel – this chapter’s exper-
iments use a linear kernel for K-nearest neighbours as well. This means all
three classiﬁers will be equipped with a linear kernel.
This leaves the K value, the number of nearest neighbours participating
in the majority vote, for which the experiments ﬁrst need to ﬁnd an optimal
value before comparing K-nearest neighbours to Support Vector Machines
and Gaussian Processes. As mentioned in Section 3.4, increasing K tends to
reduce the impact of noise, but simultaneously blurs the boundaries between
classes.
The implementation loads the training data into a GSL matrix [102], for
compatibility reasons with the more complex classiﬁers that heavily depend
on matrices. For the same reason, every entry of the test data is loaded into
a GSL vector [102] one at a time. The remaining implementation follows
straight forwardly from the algorithm:
1. Compute the measure of similarity (in this case the Euclidean norm)
between the current test datum and every training data entry.
2. Sort these distances to ﬁnd the K smallest distances.
3. Look up the class for each of these K training data entries and perform
a majority vote.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 88
6.1.4 Combining classiﬁers
What happens to the accuracy if the three machine learning classiﬁers are
combined? While several methods of combining di erent classiﬁers have
been proposed [103, 104, 105], this chapter’s experiments take the simplest
approach, which casts a majority vote of the individual classiﬁers outputs.
6.2 Analysis
This section analyses the results of comparing Support Vector Machines with
two alternative machine learning techniques: Gaussian Processes (GPs) and
K-nearest neighbours (KNNs). Initially, this section ﬁrst establishes the op-
timal K-nearest neighbours conﬁguration to use in this comparison.
6.2.1 Optimal number of neighbours in KNN
The expected result is that accuracy rises with the number of neighbours,
K, up to a certain threshold. Beyond this threshold, the vote will include
relatively distant data points that will distort the vote and lead to wrong
classiﬁcations. The aim, then, is to ﬁnd the optimal number of neighbours
just before that threshold is exceeded. Furthermore, the prediction time may
rise with the number of neighbours, and thus another aim of this section is
to determine whether there is an accuracy-speed trade-o  for increasing K.
The graphs in Figure 6.1 show how the classiﬁcation accuracy is a ected
by the number of neighbours for various training data sizes, with the number
of neighbours varying from 1 to the corresponding training data size. The
results show that there is no optimal number K across the various training
data sizes, implying that for best results K must be tuned to the training
data size. Table 6.2 lists the tuned K values, extracted from the results in
Figure 6.1, with which K-nearest neighbours will be conﬁgured for the further
experiments in this chapter.
The graph in Figure 6.2 shows how prediction time varies with the number
of neighbours. The results show that, prediction time is una ected by K.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 89
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Figure 6.1: Impact of the number of neighbours on the accuracy of
KNN for various training data sizes. The data-to-signature ratio
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Training data size Number of Neighbours (K)
4 1
10 2
20 3
50 11
75 11
100 11
Table 6.2: Tuned K values extracted from Figure 6.1, with which
K-nearest neighbours will be conﬁgured hence forth.
This is because K is only used in the algorithm once the training data items
have been compared to the test data and sorted by distance to the test
data, respectively taking O(n) and O(nlogn), where n is the training data
size. Only then are the K nearest neighbours looked up, which is a constant
operation.
6.2.2 Comparison of machine learning methods
Equipped with the optimal conﬁguration for K-nearest neighbours, this sec-
tion compares the classiﬁers in terms of accuracy, conﬁdence value, prediction
and training time, as well as training data size and false alarm rates.
6.2.2.1 Accuracy
Figure 6.3 compares the Gaussian Processes, K-nearest neighbours, and Sup-
port Vector Machines accuracy. The graph conﬁrms that Gaussian Processes
exhibit a similar accuracy to Support Vector Machines, being only slightly
less accurate than the SVMs. For data-to-signature ratios below 100:1 it is
approximately 2% less accurate. The results are similar enough, however, to
consider GPs as a serious alternative to SVMs to detect worm mutations.
The results further show that the K-nearest neighbours algorithm per-
forms considerably worse than both the Gaussian Processes and the SupportCHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 91
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Figure 6.2: Impact of the number of neighbours on the prediction
time for various data-to-signature ratios.
Vector Machines. For data-to-signature ratios below 100:1 the KNN classiﬁer
is approximately 20% to 25% worse than the other two classiﬁers.
6.2.2.2 Training data size
Section 5.3.4 showed that for Support Vector Machines, classiﬁcation accu-
racy is a ected by the training data size. The graph in Figure 6.4 shows that
Gaussian Processes are similarly a ected by the number of training data en-
tries, with the prediction accuracy rising steadily with increasing training
data size.
Although the K-nearest neighbours algorithm does not train a classiﬁer
as such (it only keeps a database of raw training data), it could still be
a ected by the training data size, albeit to a lesser extent. The results
suggest, that unlike Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, the
KNN’s classiﬁcation accuracy does not increase steadily with training data
size. Rather, prediction accuracy hovers at 71 75%, reﬂecting that the value
of K is well-tuned to the training data size.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 92
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Figure 6.3: Comparing the accuracy of SVMs, GPs, and KNN.
Training data size is 100.
6.2.2.3 Predictive likelihood
Since the previous section established that Gaussian Processes yield similar
accuracy to Support Vector Machines, this section investigates whether the
conﬁdence value returned by the Gaussian Processes can help the decision
process to further improve the results, and possibly give Gaussian Processes
the edge over Support Vector Machines.
In Gaussian Processes the conﬁdence measure is given by the predictive
likelihood, which is the average of the logarithms of all predictive posteriors.
A predictive likelihood of zero signals perfect conﬁdence in the result. The
actual values for predictive likelihood – that is, which values indicate high or
low conﬁdence – are problem speciﬁc and will be established in this section.
The graph in Figure 6.5 shows that the predictive likelihood decreases
as the data-to-signature ratio increases. This is in step with the accuracies
shown in the previous section implying that as the classiﬁcation accuracy
decreases, so does the predictive likelihood. Overlaying the GP’s accuracies
from Figure 6.3 with the predictive likelihoods from Figure 6.5 reveals that
for a training data size of 100 a predictive likelihood between  0.655 andCHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 93
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Figure 6.4: The impact of training data size on the prediction
accuracy for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and
K-nearest neighbour. The data-to-signature ratio used is 25:1.
For KNN the number of neighbours is tuned to the training data
size as described in Section 6.2.1
 0.68 signals high conﬁdence (above 90% accuracy).
The graph in Figure 6.6 shows the predictive likelihood of Gaussian Pro-
cesses at various training data sizes. As expected, the prediction conﬁdence
also increases with training data size, in step with prediction accuracy. Over-
laying the GP’s accuracies from Figure 6.4 with the predictive likelihoods
from Figure 6.5 suggests that for a data-to-signature ratio of 25:1 a predic-
tive likelihood between  0.655 and  0.672 signals high conﬁdence.
The results in this section conﬁrm the predictive likelihood o ers a prac-
tical guide as to when the classiﬁer’s decision can be overruled.
6.2.2.4 Mixed data-to-signature ratios
Section 5.3.7 in the previous chapter showed that Support Vector Machines
can cope with mixed data-to-signature ratios for data sets with low mean
data-to-signature ratios (such as 25:1) at minimal loss of accuracy, but are
more severely a ected for higher data-to-signature ratios (such as 100:1 andCHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 94
-0.695
-0.69
-0.685
-0.68
-0.675
-0.67
-0.665
-0.66
-0.655
-0.65
 100  1000
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
 
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
Data-to-signature ratio
Figure 6.5: GPs predictive likelihood (conﬁdence value) at various
data-to-signature ratios. Training data size is 100.
200:1).
The graph in Figure 6.7 compares Support Vector Machines to Gaussian
Processes and K-nearest neighbours at classifying data sets with ﬁxed and
mixed data-to-signature ratios. The ﬁxed data-to-signature ratio is 25:1 while
the mixed data-to-signature ratio is normally distributed with mean 25:1;
standard deviation of 20 was selected as in Section 5.3.7.
The results show that the accuracy obtained with Gaussian Processes
using mixed data-to-signature ratios is approximately 5% less than with ﬁxed
data-to-signature ratios. By comparison, the gap in Support Vector Machines
is approximately 1%. The results for K-nearest neighbours show a drop of
approximately 13% in accuracy when the data-to-signature ratio is mixed.
As in the previous sections, the accuracy of the KNN algorithm at detecting
worm mutations of known worms remains signiﬁcantly below that of Support
Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 95
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Figure 6.6: The impact of training data size on the prediction
conﬁdence for Gaussian Processes at a data-to-signature ratio of
25:1.
6.2.2.5 False alarm rates
As with the Support Vector Machines in Section 5.3.8, Receiver Operator
Characteristics (ROC) graphs are used to investigate false alarm rates. Also
as in Section 5.3.8, the conﬁdence measure for Support Vector Machines is
obtained by calculating the distance to the hyperplane. For K-nearest neigh-
bours instance ranking (based on the algorithm in [106]) was used. Gaussian
Processes as mentioned return the conﬁdence measure natively.
Figure 6.8 compares the ROC curves for the Support Vector Machines,
Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours classiﬁers. The results conﬁrm
that, as with accuracy, the KNN’s area under the curve (AUC) is considerably
less than both the Gaussian Processes or Support Vector Machines, meaning
that KNN su ers from a considerably higher number of false alarms.
As with accuracy, Gaussian Processes rival Support Vector Machines,
covering only a slightly less area under a curve.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 96
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Figure 6.7: Prediction accuracy comparing SVMs, GPs, and KNN
trained and tested with a single ﬁxed data-to-signature ratio and
a mixed data-to-signature ratio with comparable mean.
6.2.3 Combining classiﬁers
Figure 6.9 shows the prediction accuracy for classiﬁer combinations using a
majority vote to obtain a classiﬁcation. Normally it would make sense to
combine only an odd number of classiﬁers; for completeness, however, the
graph also shows the prediction accuracy for all possible pair combinations,
using a uniform random number generator to break ties where necessary.
From the results it can be seen that no combination beats the standalone
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes classiﬁers. A probable
explanation is that Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes do not
complement each other well and show similar predictions for the same test
input data. K-nearest neighbours pulls down the average dramatically in
every duo in which it participates.
However, in combination with Support Vector Machines and Gaussian
Processes it appears to be outvoted most of the time, reducing the accuracy
only marginally.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 97
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Figure 6.8: ROC curve showing the trade-o  between true and
false positive rates for SVMs, GPs, and KNN. Data-to-signature
ratio is 100:1.
6.3 Summary
This chapter compared the performance of Support Vector Machines to that
of Gaussian Processes and K-nearest neighbours for detecting worm muta-
tions, with the following ﬁndings:
• SVMs and GPs show similar accuracies. Support Vector Ma-
chines and Gaussian Processes consistently showed similar accuracies,
with SVMs being marginally more accurate than GPs. Both Support
Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes achieve decisively higher ac-
curacy than K-nearest neighbour.
• Tuning the number of neighbours in KNN. The number of neigh-
bours in K-nearest neighbours needs to be tuned to the training data
size since there is no silver bullet value that works well across all train-
ing data sizes.
• GP conﬁdence measures o er a practical guide. The conﬁdence
measure returned by Gaussian Processes is low when accuracy is low,CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 98
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Figure 6.9: Prediction accuracy for various combinations of classi-
ﬁers. Data-to-signature ratio is 200:1, since it best illustrates the
trends of all data-to-signature ratios investigated.
rendering it a practical tool to further improve the accuracy of Gaussian
Processes.
• SVM and GP accuracy dependent on training data size. Ac-
curacy increases steadily with training data size for Support Vector
Machines and Gaussian Processes, the rise being steeper for Support
Vector Machines. K-nearest neighbours is tuned to training data size
and accuracy hovers just above 70% for all training data sizes.
• SVMs cope best with mixed data-to-signature ratios. Support
Vector Machines cope better with data sets of mixed data-to-signature
ratios than Gaussian Processes. K-nearest neighbours, however, does
not fare well with mixed data-to-signature ratios.
• SVMs and GPs have similar false alarm rates. Receiver oper-
ator characteristic graphs conﬁrm that Gaussian Processes have only
a marginally higher false alarm rate than Support Vector Machines,
whereas K-nearest neighbours perform considerably worse.CHAPTER 6. ALTERNATIVE MACHINE LEARNING METHODS 99
• Standalone SVM and GP classiﬁers work best. No combination
of classiﬁers (using majority vote) beats the standalone Support Vector
Machines and Gaussian Processes classiﬁers.
The ﬁnal verdict is that Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes
were close rivals, with Support Vector Machines achieving a few percent
points higher accuracy on average. K-nearest neighbours were constantly
outperformed by Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes. The re-
sults also underline that for the techniques to work successfully, it is impor-
tant that a su cient amount of training data is available. The next chapter
explores the possibility of automatically generating such training data.Chapter 7
Generating worm mutations
The experiments in the previous two chapters showed that machine learning
techniques successfully detect worm mutations. More precisely, the results
showed that, given su cient training data, the machine learning techniques
generate classiﬁers able to detect worm mutations.
However, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1, these experiments used synthetic
worm mutations for training data due to the lack of a wide spectrum of worm
mutations in the wild. For a real-life deployment of the machine learning
classiﬁers, obtaining a su ciently large sample of training data poses a chal-
lenge. This chapter provides the missing link: a worm mutation generator
that automatically generates worm mutations.
This chapter ﬁrst describes two approaches taken by the worm mutation
generator: structurally generating mutations by programmatically replacing
the executable payload, and randomly generating mutations by intercepting
malicious network ﬂows and arbitrarily changing bytes in these ﬂows. The
chapter then compares which of the two approaches yields the higher quality
training data in terms of classiﬁer accuracy.
7.1 Structurally mutated worms
The concept of the structural worm mutation generator is to take a known
exploit and programatically change the executable payload to generate worm
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mutations. This approach is consistent with the worm model introduced in
Section 4.1, which deﬁned worm mutations as worms sharing the same exploit
code, and reﬂects the approaches taken by past worm mutations such as Code
Red I and Code Red II.
Three real exploits were selected from the Metasploit framework [25], a
toolkit for exploit developers and security professionals, which provides a vast
collection of well documented exploits. The exploits were chosen according
to three key criteria. First, they had to be fairly straightforward to adapt
and so lend themselves well for creating worm mutations easily. Second, they
should blend into normal tra c in the sense that ﬁles such as those used for
the executable payload do not appear anomalous. And third, to be as diverse
from one another as possible in terms of communication protocol, payload
types and payload sizes, and so ensure that any results apply to a wide range
of worms.
The three worms created – named Distcc worm, Minishare worm, and
WarFTP worm after the services they exploit – are described in detail in the
following sections. These worms will also serve as the source worms for the
randomly mutated worms described later in Section 7.2.
7.1.1 Distcc worm
Distcc [94] is a C/C++ compiler framework for distributing builds across
several Linux machines on a network. An exploit [107] allowing arbitrary
execution of shell commands is made available by Metasploit.
The worm infection works in four stages:
1. Launching the exploit, which opens the door to execute arbitrary shell
commands on the target machine at the same user-level as the Distcc
daemon.
2. Uploading the worm’s executable payload in source code form. This is
achieved seamlessly by piping the source code into a temporary ﬁle on
the target host with the cat shell command.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 102
3. Compiling and executing the uploaded source code. This uses the gcc
(Gnu Compiler Collection) [108] command, which is present on most
Linux installations, and since Distcc is essentially a gcc wrapper, can
be safely assumed to be present on the victim.
4. Opening a backdoor telnet on port 4444 with a one line Perl command,
allowing arbitrary shell commands to be executed.
The executable payload would usually also include spreading logic, such
as generating a set of random IP addresses to probe next, and possibly some
potentially malicious behaviour, such as corrupting the infected machine’s
hard-drive. For this chapter’s experiments it su ces to infect the host and see
if the payload was executed, and so the worms do not include any spreading
logic or malicious payload.
7.1.2 Minishare worm
Minishare [95] is a trimmed-down web server for Microsoft Windows designed
for ﬁle sharing via a browser interface. A bu er overﬂow exploit [109] allowing
arbitrary Windows executables to be uploaded and executed is made available
by Metasploit.
The Minishare worm works in three stages:
1. The attacking host makes the executable payload available for down-
loading by binding to a known local port. The worm will call back on
this port once it has successfully infected the host.
2. The attacking host launches the exploit code against the target. If
successful, the worm then calls back on the attacking host to download
the executable payload.
3. The worm on the infected host launches the downloaded payload.
Unlike the Distcc worm, the Minishare worm does not download its ex-
ecutable payload in source form but as a binary executable. The download
callback is a simple HTTP request, which the attacking host serves with We-
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worm, the executable payload injected by the generator into the Minishare
worm does not contain any spreading logic.
Since Minishare is primarily intended for ﬁle sharing, the uploading of
binary data will not appear anomalous. That would not be the case if Min-
ishare were intended for use as a regular web server where the dominant type
of ﬁle transferred would be text-based web pages.
7.1.3 WarFTP worm
WarFTP [111] daemon is a simple File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server for
Windows. A stack-based bu er overﬂow vulnerability [112] is available in
Metasploit that allows arbitrary Windows executables to be uploaded and
launched.
The WarFTP worm works similarly to the Minishare worm:
1. The attacking host makes the executable payload available for down-
load by binding to a known local port.
2. The attacking host launches the exploit code against the target, and
on success calls back to download the payload.
3. The worm on the infected host launches the downloaded payload.
The di erence between the WarFTP worm and the Minishare worm goes
beyond the use of di erent vulnerable services. The WarFTP worm was cho-
sen because it can carry payloads considerably larger than both Minishare
and Distcc without appearing anomalous. This allows the experiments to
verify whether, as would be expected, the data-to-signature ratio plays a sig-
niﬁcant part in the quality of generated classiﬁers. The reason the WarFTP
worm does not appear anomalous is that it exploits the FTP service, and as
such it would not be uncommon to observe large ﬁle transfers in everyday
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7.2 Randomly mutated worms
The basic idea of the random worm mutation generator is to (i) intercept a
worm en route from an attacking host to a target host, (ii) generate a set of
mutations by randomly mutating the worm’s byte stream, and (iii) forward
the generated mutations to the original target. The next sections discuss in
detail the random mutation generator’s requirements and its architecture.
7.2.1 Requirements
The random worm mutation generator must:
• Intercept worms en route from one host to the next. In order
for the system to mutate intercepted worms, it must be able to capture
them in their entirety. This involves reassembling worms that may have
been split into several packets, as well as reordering packets that arrive
out of order.
• Work transparently. The generator must forward all packets so
that the attacker remains unaware of its existence, e ectively acting as
a transparent proxy.
• Determine whether the target was successfully infected. Af-
ter the worm’s mutations have been forwarded to the worm’s original
target host, the generator must determine whether the target was suc-
cessfully infected. Without this check the mutation can not be labelled
as malicious or benign, and thus can not serve as training data.
• Store generated mutations. The ﬁnal step after determining whether
a mutation is malicious or benign is to store it accordingly. This builds
up the training data set of labelled mutations that later will be fed into
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7.2.2 Architecture
The high-level architecture consists of three machines connected in series, as
shown in Figure 7.1. Machine A is the attacker from which the original worm
is launched and machine C is the worm’s target. Machine B sits between
machines A and C and acts as a transparent proxy that mutates worms.
A typical cycle in this architecture looks as follows:
1. Machine A launches the original worm at machine C
2. Machine B intercepts the worm by reassembling the packets in the ﬂow
3. Machine B randomly mutates the intercepted worm
4. Machine B forwards the mutation to machine C
5. Machine B queries machine C whether the attack succeeded
6. Machine B stores the mutation if the attack succeeded
The worm model introduced in Section 4.1 deﬁned a worm mutation as a
worm that exploits the same vulnerability as the original worm, but executes
a di erent payload upon successful inﬁltration. Thus an attack of random
mutation will only succeed if the mutation alters the executable payload
without a ecting either the application speciﬁc data (which is required to
successfully transport the worm) or the exploit (which is required to inﬁltrate
the target). Only successful attacks will be labelled as malicious.
The random mutation generator is an attractive extension over the struc-
tural mutation generator since it o ers a fully automated method to gener-
ating worm mutations. While the structural mutation requires knowledge
about the worm’s structure – in particular the location of its payload – the
random mutation generator treats worms as black boxes and requires no such
prior knowledge. The experiments in this chapter will tell whether the ran-
dom mutations can match their structural counterparts in serving as high
quality training data.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 106
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Figure 7.1: How the worm mutation generator ﬁts into the over-
all worm detection architecture. The worm mutation adds a pre-
learning phase that generates the training data (top) for the learn-
ing phase (middle).CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 107
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Figure 7.2: Gauging the mutation degree. A high mutation
probability and small chunk size (top) yields ﬁne-grained muta-
tions. A large chunk size and low mutation probability (bottom)
produces more coarse-grained mutations.
7.3 Experiment design
The experiments will test the quality of the worms generated by the worm
mutation generator in two parts: ﬁrst for the structurally mutated worms
and second for the randomly mutated worms.
To challenge the classiﬁer, the benign mutations closely resembled their
malicious counterparts except that they were disarmed of the exploit code.
In the case of the WarFTP worm, for example, the benign trace consists
of an FTP ﬁle transfer of the executable payload, minus the exploit code.
Similarly, for Minishare the executable payload was uploaded to the ﬁle shar-
ing repository without launching it. For Distcc the benign traces remotely
compile the source code but do not execute it.
For the random mutation generator, the experiments will test the im-
pact of the mutation degree on classiﬁer accuracy. Two parameters control
the mutation degree: the mutation probability and the mutation chunk size
(Figure 7.2). Thinking of the tra c as an array of bytes b, the mutation
probability determines whether an intercepted byte bi should be mutated.
The mutation chunk size n then controls how many of the subsequent bytes
bi,bi+1,...,bi+n 1 will be mutated. The experiments will investigate the im-
pact of both the mutation probability and the mutation chunk size on clas-CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 108
siﬁer accuracy.
7.3.1 Isolated testing network
Due to the hazardous nature of worms the experiments were conducted in
an isolated testing network. This network consists of three machines inter-
connected via a hub1: (i) a client machine from which attacks are launched,
(ii) a server machine that runs the vulnerable software, and (iii) a machine
hosting the forwarding proxy, which sits between the attacker and the tar-
get, intercepting tra c between the two. This setup derives directly from
the architecture described in Section 7.2.2.
The machines used were AMD Athlon XP 2200 with 1 GB of physical
memory. The target machine was a dual boot system running Ubuntu Linux
7.04 and Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 1. The reason for using a
dated Windows version was that it is known to contain many security holes,
and as such o ers an ideal breeding ground for the worm mutations. The
other two machines ran Ubuntu Linux 7.04.
7.3.2 Implementation of a worm testing framework
In addition to the hardware setup described above, the experiments were
driven by a custom-built distributed worm testing framework. This frame-
work, implemented in Ruby, automates the execution of the experiments by
providing a central interface from which to (i) reset the testbed, (ii) select
an attack type, (iii) launch the attack, and (iv) verify whether the infection
was successful.
The framework’s distributed components map directly to the hardware
setup in the previous section and therefore consist of an attacker, a target,
and a forwarding proxy. These components run as agents on their hardware
counterparts using the Distributed Ruby API [110], and are remotely co-
ordinated by a central controller. The controller conducts the following event
1Note that a hub was used rather than an Ethernet switch since hubs forward tra c
on all ports thereby allowing communications to be tapped.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 109
      
          
                               
                                
              
                          
                         
Figure 7.3: Worm testing framework. Agent interaction during an
attack cycle.
sequence (Figure 7.3 shows the interaction of the agents for the ﬁrst 5 steps):
1. Select a worm and arm the attacker with this worm
2. Launch the vulnerable service on the target
3. Start the forwarding proxy and recording the ﬂow
4. Launch the attack
5. Query whether the target was successfully infected
6. Store the mutated ﬂow under malicious or benign
7. Stop recording the ﬂow and reset the target host
The central controller can sit on either of the three machines, or on a ded-
icated machine. For convenience, the experiments run the controller on theCHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 110
forwarding proxy machine. Each worm attack is encapsulated in a dedicated
class with the command design pattern [113].
For structurally mutated worms the proxy simply records the tra c ﬂows
and then transparently forwards them to the target. For randomly generated
worms the proxy additionally randomly mutates bytes with a given proba-
bility as discussed in the outset of this Section.
The forwarding proxy uses sockets in a modiﬁed version of port proxy [114].
Sockets o er an attractive solution since they deal with the TCP ﬂow’s
contents directly, freeing the mutation generator from having to reassemble
ﬂows2. A drawback of the sockets approach is that the ports under attack
must be known in advance since they can only bind to ﬁxed ports. While
this is adequate for the controlled environment of this chapter’s experiments,
it poses a restriction for production use. A workaround is to accept con-
nections from all ports, which could be implemented with an open source
routing gateway package such as the Click modular router [115].
The querying of the target is implemented by having the worm emit its
unique ID to a log ﬁle. For the Distcc worm this is easily implemented
with an echo command in the shell command sequence that is part of the
executable payload. For Minishare, which carries compiled C programs as its
executable payload, writing to the log ﬁle is achieved by injecting fprintf
statements into the programs’ source code. WarFTP, which carries binary
executables for which source code is not available, achieves this by wrapping
the executables in another executable that emits an fprintf before launching
the wrapped executable. The wrapper is a simple C program that embeds
the executable as a hex string generated by the xxd Unix utility.
7.3.3 Structurally mutated worms
Key experiments from the previous two chapters are repeated using struc-
turally mutated worms. In particular, the accuracy of Support Vector Ma-
chines, Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours at various training
2Flows would have to be reassembled manually if a packet capturing library such as
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data sizes is compared for each of the worms.
A data set of 400 mutations was created for each worm. As in previous
experiments, half of these were malicious and the other half benign. Var-
ious training data sizes were investigated by selecting an equal number of
malicious and benign mutations as training data, and selecting 100 of the
remaining mutations (again half malicious and half benign) as test data. Ex-
periments were repeated 50 times to obtain averages and standard deviations.
For Distcc, mutations were created by substituting the source code ﬁle
that is uploaded and executed with typical C tutorial programs. As such the
Distcc worm mutations carry a small payload with an average trace size of
1.7KB at a standard deviation of 1.1. The exploit size is 0.3KB, resulting in
an average data-to-signature ratio of 5.7:1
Structural mutations of the Minishare worm were created by substituting
the executable payload with small binary executables. For this the set of C
tutorial programs from the Distcc worm was compiled, resulting in an average
trace size of 8.4KB and a standard deviation of 1.7. Given an exploit size of
2.2KB, this yields a low average data-signature-ratio of 3.8:1.
WarFTP structural mutations were created by substituting the executable
payloads with exemplar Windows executables. The average trace size was
82.4KB with standard deviation of 55.2. With an exploit size of 1KB,
WarFTP has the highest average data-to-signature ratio of the three worms
with 82.4:1. The experiments will show how well the classiﬁer can cope with
such a high data-to-signature ratio.
7.3.4 Randomly mutated worms
These experiments compare classiﬁers trained with the structurally mutated
worms from the previous section with classiﬁers trained with randomly gen-
erated worm mutations. To allow for a fair comparison, the training data
for the latter consists solely of randomly generated mutations, while the test
data consists of the same structurally mutated worms and benign data used
in the previous section.
The experiments for the random mutation generator require a sourceCHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 112
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Figure 7.4: Structurally mutated Distcc worm. Accuracy
vs. training data size for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours.
from which random mutations are generated. For each of the three worms
the source worm was selected to be as close to the average size as possible.
7.4 Analysis
The analysis follows the structure of the experiment design. First the results
of repeating key experiments from the previous two chapters on structurally
mutated worm mutations are presented and discussed. The best performing
machine learning technique is then used to test the random mutations and
the two results are compared.
7.4.1 E ectiveness of structurally mutated worms
This section looks at the results for the Distcc, Minishare and WarFTP worm
mutations in turn.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 113
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Figure 7.5: Structurally mutated Minishare worm. Accu-
racy vs. training data size for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian
Processes, and K-nearest neighbours.
7.4.1.1 Distcc worm
Figure 7.4 compares the accuracy of Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours on the Distcc worm. The graph shows that
the accuracy increases for Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes
up to a training data size of 50, after which the accuracy levels o . For
training data sizes below 20, K-nearest neighbours lags not too far behind
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, while showing consider-
ably less accuracy for higher training data sizes.
As in the previous chapter, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Pro-
cesses achieve similar high accuracy for training data sizes above 50, peaking
at 98% accuracy. For training data sizes below 50, Support Vector Machines
perform noticeably better than Gaussian Processes.
7.4.1.2 Minishare worm
Figure 7.5 compares Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-
nearest neighbours on structural Minishare mutations. As for the DistccCHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 114
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Figure 7.6: Structurally mutated WarFTP worm. Accuracy
vs. training data size for Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours.
mutations, classiﬁcation accuracy increases with training data size for Sup-
port Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes.
The rise in accuracy is considerably steeper for Support Vector Machines
and Gaussian Processes than with Distcc, climbing to near 100% accuracy
for training data sizes as low as 10. The steep rise suggests that the training
stage is able to detect a pattern sooner than for Distcc, the most likely
explanation being the lower data-to-signature ratio.
As with Distcc, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes perform
similarly well except for very small training data sizes. K-nearest neighbours
performs worse altogether, hitting a maximum of just over 60% accuracy.
7.4.1.3 WarFTP worm
Figure 7.6 compares Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-
nearest neighbours for structural WarFTP mutations. Compared to the
Distcc and Minishare results, the climb in accuracy for increasing training
data size is more gradual, indicating that the larger data-to-signature ratioCHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 115
makes it more di cult to extract a distinguishing pattern.
Of the three worms, WarFTP achieves the lowest maximum accuracy for
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, peaking at around 95%.
Again the most probable explanation is the high data-to-signature ratio. The
accuracy for K-nearest neighbours is considerably worse, consistently tailing
SVMs and GPs by around 25% from training data sizes larger than 50.
As with Distcc and Minishare, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian
Processes perform comparably.
7.4.1.4 Discussion
In summary, the results of the structural worm mutation experiments showed
that:
• As with synthetic worms, Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Pro-
cesses show higher classiﬁcation accuracy than K-nearest neighbours
• Classiﬁcation accuracy depends on the data-to-signature ratio, with
smaller data-to-signature ratios leading to higher accuracy
The results in this section have set the bar for the randomly mutated
worms investigated in the next section. The results obtained for the three
worms used in this section will now be compared directly to results obtained
using training data sets generated by the random worm mutation generator.
7.4.2 E ectiveness of randomly mutated worms
Are the randomly mutated worm mutations suitable as training data for
the machine learning classiﬁers? This section attempts to answer this ques-
tion by comparing classiﬁers trained with randomly mutated worms to those
trained with structurally mutated worms from the previous section. Based
on the results of the previous section, the results in this section will base its
comparison on Support Vector Machines.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 116
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Figure 7.7: Randomly mutated Distcc worm. Prediction Ac-
curacy vs training data size for classiﬁers trained of the randomly
mutated Distcc worm. Mutation probability was 0.005 with a
chunk size of 300 bytes.
7.4.2.1 Distcc worm
Figure 7.7 compares the prediction accuracy of the structural mutations with
random mutations of the Distcc worm. The results are promising, and show
that classiﬁers trained with random mutations match that of structural mu-
tations up to training data sizes of 10, topping at 90% accuracy for training
data size 20.
For training data sizes greater than 20 accuracy drops, most likely due
to overﬁtting. Recall that the random mutations are generated from the
same source worm, and for larger training data sizes the training phase could
falsely pick up parts of the source code as being part of the exploit code,
especially if those parts have not been mutated by the random byte mutator.
7.4.2.2 Minishare worm
The results of the Minishare worm show a di erent trend to Distcc, but are
equally encouraging. Accuracy increases steadily for the random mutationsCHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 117
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Figure 7.8: Randomly mutated Minishare worm. Prediction
Accuracy vs training data size for classiﬁers trained with generated
Minishare worm mutations. Mutation probability was 0.005 with
a chunk size of 250 bytes.
with increasing training data size, but less gradually than the structural
mutations, suggesting that the training stage requires a larger spectrum of
random mutations than structural mutations to detect a common pattern.
The classiﬁer reaches an encouraging maximum accuracy of 95% for ran-
dom mutations, just 5% below that of structural mutations.
7.4.2.3 WarFTP worm
Figure 7.9 shows the results for the WarFTP worm. Out of the three worms
investigated, this worm proved the most di cult for the classiﬁers, achieving
the lowest accuracy for classiﬁers trained with random mutations of just 55%
accuracy for smaller training sizes.
The most likely explanation for this poor result is both the high data-
to-signature ratio (82.4:1) and the large standard deviation of the average
payload size (standard deviation 55.2 for an average payload size of 82.4KB).CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 118
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Figure 7.9: Randomly mutated WarFTP worms. Prediction
Accuracy vs training data size for classiﬁers trained with generated
WarFTP worm mutations. Mutation probability was 0.0001 with
a chunk size of 1000 bytes.
7.4.2.4 Varying the mutation degree
The previous experiments kept the mutation degree ﬁxed for each worm.
Figure 7.10 analyses the impact of varying the number of bytes mutated,
showing that accuracy increases as more bytes are mutated. Similarly Fig-
ure 7.11 analyses the impact of varying the mutation probability, showing
that accuracy increases with higher mutation probability.
Combined, the results suggest that a higher mutation degree leads to a
better trained classiﬁer, as expected. As more bytes are mutated, the training
phase is able to narrow down the common pattern onto the exploit code.
7.4.2.5 Discussion
The results of the randomly mutated worms were encouraging. Especially
the Minishare experiments have shown that the random worm mutation gen-
erator is suitable to generate training data for machine learning classiﬁers,
albeit with less overall accuracy than for structural mutationsCHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 119
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Figure 7.10: Impact of mutation chunk size (with a ﬁxed prob-
ability of 0.005, and training data size of 20) on the prediction
accuracy of randomly mutated Distcc worms.
Unusual about the Distcc results was that accuracy dropped for larger
training sizes. Of the three worms, Distcc was the only one with a payload
in source code form rather than as a binary executable, hinting that the
classiﬁer is prone to overﬁt purely-text based random mutations.
The results of the WarFTP worm were, however, less encouraging: with
an accuracy of 55%, the classiﬁer was little more than guessing the predic-
tions. The poor results could be the result of the high data-to-signature
ratio (82.4:1). By comparison, Distcc has a data-to-signature ratio of 5.7:1
but achieves 90% accuracy, while Minishare achieves up to 95% accuracy
with a data-to-signature ratio of 3.8:1.
Gauging the mutation degree showed that accuracy improves as more
bytes are mutated. However, the trade-o  here is time. For example, with a
mutation probability of 0.01 and a chunk size of 100 bytes, Distcc yielded a
malicious mutation every 25 mutation cycles. Given that a random mutation
cycle in the worm testing framework takes around 9 seconds to complete, the
total time to build a training data size of, say, 100 malicious mutations is
just over 6 hours.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 120
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Figure 7.11: Impact of mutation probability (with a ﬁxed chunk
size of 100 bytes, and training data size of 20) on the prediction
accuracy of randomly mutated Distcc worms.
7.5 Summary
This chapter ﬂagged the need to automatically generate worm mutations to
serve as training data for machine learning classiﬁers due to the lack of worm
mutations in the wild. In particular, this chapter investigated:
• How to generate training data. Described the design, implemen-
tation and deployment of a worm mutation generator to handle this
automation in two ways: structurally mutating worms by programati-
cally replacing executable payloads, and randomly mutating worms by
altering their byte streams arbitrarily.
• E ectiveness of generated structural mutations. Evaluated the
structural mutation generator of the machine learning algorithms (Sup-
port Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes, and K-nearest neighbours)
by repeating the key experiments of the previous chapter. The results
showed that the quality of the generated structural mutations are suf-
ﬁciently high to serve as training data.CHAPTER 7. GENERATING WORM MUTATIONS 121
• E ectiveness of generated random mutations. Compared ran-
dom mutations to structural mutations using Support Vector Machines.
The results showed that for Distcc and Minishare the quality of the ran-
dom mutations is also su ciently high to serve as training data, with
the added bonus that they require no prior knowledge about the worm.
To conclude, this chapter has shown that using the worm mutation generator
is a viable option for generating training data.Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Discussion
The worm problem a ects us all. Today’s news is ﬁlled with stories about
spam ﬂooding the Internet, phishing sites relieving people of their savings,
Trojans harvesting sensitive information for identity theft, and worms cloak-
ing as benign network tra c to sneak past ﬁrewalls and wreaking havoc.
Many network intrusion detection systems [43, 42, 14, 47, 53, 54] have
been written to protect both private users and large organisations, but no
matter how frequently the software is updated, it always seems to lag one step
behind worm authors. This dissertation has the ambitious goal of not just
levelling the playing ﬁeld but to turn it upside down – to leverage the power
of machine learning to automatically detect mutations of known worms.
Detecting worms has often been likened to ﬁnding a needle in a haystack.
Machine learning [56, 57, 58], and in a larger context artiﬁcial intelligence,
have long been hailed for their successes in recognising patterns [15, 66, 67],
and it is this power that this dissertation attempts to harness.
Conceptually, by feeding machine learning techniques a training set, ma-
chine learning techniques are able to ﬁnd distinguishing features in the train-
ing data that enables them to classify unknown data. The approach of this
dissertation was to build an intrusion detection system that is fed both worm
(malicious) tra c and normal (benign) tra c as training data, so that it can
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automatically ﬁlter worm mutations out of everyday network tra c.
The past years have witnessed rapid growth and advances in the ﬁeld
of machine learning, and so one of the key decisions of this dissertation was
which machine learning algorithm to use. Of all machine learning techniques,
Support Vector Machines [15] have risen to prominence since the 1990’s.
The popularity of Support Vector Machines is not unfounded: they have
successfully been applied to a large number of real-world pattern recognition
problems including categorisation [66], image classiﬁcation [67], and hand-
written character recognition [15].
With such a good track record of detecting patterns, can Support Vec-
tor Machines ﬁnd that proverbial needle in the haystack? Answering this
question was the task of the ﬁrst part of this dissertation, with encourag-
ing results: the classiﬁer reached 99% accuracy for the most common worm
data-to-signature ratio of 25:11. Even more encouraging was that Support
Vector Machines are resilient to a fair degree of distortion, a popular tech-
nique with worm authors to cloak their worms. The results also suggest
that Support Vector Machines could detect polymorphic worms [116], which
bypass conventional intrusion detection systems by mutating themselves at
each network hop.
The solid results for Support Vector Machines in detecting worms raised
additional questions addressed by this dissertation: how do other machine
learning techniques fare in detecting worm mutations? Can the results of
Support Vector Machines be bettered by other popular machine learning
techniques? The second part of this dissertation was devoted to answer-
ing these questions by comparing Support Vector Machines with Gaussian
Processes [16] and K-nearest neighbours [17].
Gaussian Processes have a theoretical edge over Support Vector Machines
in that they return a conﬁdence measure with their classiﬁcation, which
a secondary classiﬁer (for example a human) could leverage to potentially
1Interestingly, worm authors strive for a highly compact executable payload for faster
spreading, e ectively reducing the data-to-signature. The results show that the smaller the
data-to-signature ratio, the higher the accuracy of the classiﬁer. Conversely, a less skilled
worm author who produces larger code might make it more di cult on the classiﬁer.CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 124
reduce the number of false alarms. K-nearest neighbours, being a very simple
and intuitive algorithm, o ered another angle on how good the results of
Support Vector Machines really were.
Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes were close rivals, with
Support Vector Machines achieving a few percent points higher accuracy
than Gaussian Processes, on average. While Support Vector Machines and
Gaussian Processes proved to be a close call, K-nearest neighbours was out-
performed by both Support Vector Machines and Gaussian Processes, and
that despite the number of neighbours being tuned to the training data size.
Comparing Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Processes and, to a lesser
extent also K-nearest neighbours, underlined that training data size is piv-
otal to the success of detecting worm mutations. This poses a challenge for
deploying such classiﬁers in the real-world: the number of worm mutation
traces in the wild is limited, potentially starving such a classiﬁer of its key
resource needed to detect worms.
The mission of the third and ﬁnal part of this dissertation, then, was to
ﬁnd a way to secure the vital training data that fuels the classiﬁers. The
result was a worm mutation generator that automatically generates worm
mutations in two ways: (i) structurally mutating a source worm by replacing
its executable payload, and, (ii) randomly mutating chunks of its trace. The
results showed that the quality of the generated structural worm mutations
were of high quality, suitable to serve as training data. The random worm
mutations showed encouraging results as well, generating good quality train-
ing data for the two of the three worms investigated, with the important
added bonus that they require no prior knowledge of the worm aside from
being in possession of a known, lethal trace of the original worm.
This dissertation achieved its ambitious goal of putting network intrusion
detection systems one step ahead of worm authors by automatically detect-
ing worm mutations. It has laid the groundwork to yield a powerful weapon
against the worm threat: a network intrusion detection system armed with a
Support Vector Machine classiﬁer, fed by the worm mutation generator with
training data. This system should be powerful and accurate enough to au-CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 125
tomatically detect mutations of worms with little to no human intervention.
This dissertation has laid a solid foundation, and the next chapter will look
at how this solid foundation can be further extended.
8.2 Contributions
This work contributes to the defence against computer worms in the following
ways:
• Feasibility of Support Vector Machines in detecting worm mu-
tations. A thorough investigation into the feasibility of using machine
learning based pattern recognition techniques to detect worm muta-
tions was conducted. In particular, the optimal conﬁguration of Sup-
port Vector Machines, including choice of kernel, n-gram extraction
size, and training data sizes was investigated. The resilience to signa-
ture mutations and signature corruption, as well as the ability to cope
with mixed data-to-signature ratios, was also investigated.
• Comparison of alternative machine learning techniques in de-
tecting worm mutations. Support Vector Machines were compared
to two alternative machine learning techniques, Gaussian Processes and
K-nearest neighbours, with regards to how e ectively they detect worm
mutations. The results demonstrated that Support Vector Machines
show slightly higher accuracy than Gaussian Processes, while K-nearest
neighbours perform considerably worse. Gaussian Processes return a
conﬁdence value with their predictions, and this conﬁdence was shown
to o er a practical guide when the classiﬁer is uncertain.
• Automatically generating training data. A worm mutation gen-
erator was developed in order to overcome the problem of limited avail-
ability of training data in the wild. The results conﬁrmed the encour-
aging results from the previous chapters, as well as that training data
for the machine leaning techniques can be generated using structural
and, to a lesser degree, random mutation strategies.Chapter 9
Future work
This dissertation has successfully shown that machine learning techniques are
suitable for detecting worm mutations. Yet this is just the beginning. The
machine learning techniques explored in this dissertation must now prove
themselves in the real world, and this opens some interesting and exciting
opportunities for future work.
This chapter looks into some of these opportunities: defending against
sophisticated worm attack strategies, designing a custom kernel, alternative
feature representation, real-time detection, online training, cascading classi-
ﬁers, and scaling the infrastructure.
9.1 Sophisticated worm attack strategies
Worm authors often go to great lengths to maximise the potency and lethality
of their worms. This has led to highly sophisticated attack strategies, which
begs the question how robust the approach proposed in this work is to such
strategies. This section describes some of these attack strategies and discusses
how the work of this dissertation could be made more robust against such
attacks.
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9.1.1 Polymorphic blending attack
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, polymorphic worms are worms that mutate
themselves in such a way that their signature changes at every hop when
traversing a network. Anomaly detection systems, by their nature of search-
ing for anomalies rather than intrusions, lend themselves well to the detection
of polymorphic worms.
An attack strategy that takes polymorphic worms to the next level are
polymorphic blending attacks [117]. These attacks essentially consist of poly-
morphic worms that not only mutate from hop to hop, but also mutate in
such a way that they blend in with normal tra c. Polymorphic blending
attacks have been shown to successfully evade byte frequency based anomaly
detection systems by morphing in such a way that their extracted features
blend with normal tra c [117].
Since the approach advocated by this work uses n-gram based feature
extraction, it is possible that it would be bypassed by polymorphic blending
attacks. Consequently it would be interesting to investigate how the mecha-
nism proposed in this work copes with polymorphic blending attacks, and to
ascertain whether alternative feature representations such as those discussed
in Section 9.3 improve the performance.
9.1.2 Zero day vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are typically discovered months before worms that exploit
them are released. It is possible, however, that a worm author discovers a
previously undisclosed vulnerability and releases a worm on the same day.
Such worms are known as zero day worms. This dissertation focuses on
detecting mutations of known worms and as such will not be capable of
detecting worms on which it has not been trained, whether they are zero day
worms or not.
However, classiﬁers in this dissertation are built using training data that
contains both benign and malicious ﬂows, and the classiﬁers learn to distin-
guish between the two classes. Using a conﬁdence measure, such as provided
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further investigation. This mechanism could be used to defend against zero
day exploits.
9.1.3 Poisoning of benign tra c
A form of attack that has been shown to fool automatic signature generators,
such as Polygraph [48], is to poison benign tra c by deliberately injecting
well-crafted noise [118]. This poisoning can be accomplished by sending
out an instance of benign tra c for every instance of malicious tra c. For
example, for every attack of a vulnerable service, a worm could also perform
a benign request to that service, which includes the exploit code, with the
only di erence that the exploit will not be executed.
By poisoning the benign tra c, it becomes increasingly di cult to dis-
tinguish between malicious and benign ﬂows. The problem is that signature
generators are at their most vulnerable in the training phase. The same is
true for machine learning based classiﬁers: if given mislabelled training data
they will not be able to build a good classiﬁer.
This dissertation builds on the assumption that training data is correctly
labelled and has not been deliberately poisoned. It would be interesting
to investigate how susceptible machine learning is to poisoned tra c, and,
if found to be highly susceptible, how the classiﬁers could be made more
robust. A way to carry out this investigation is to feed the training stage
with deliberately mislabelled data, for example labelling 5% of the benign
data as malicious.
9.2 Designing a custom kernel
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, a kernel conceptually measures the similarity
between two data points in a given feature space. Kernels such as the RBF
kernel deal with non-linearly separable data by implicitly mapping the data
to a higher dimensional feature space. As such, the accuracy of the classiﬁer
depends on how suitable the feature space can represent the data at hand.
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focus of recent work was to build a custom kernel [119, 71, 120]. Indeed,
the string kernel [71] used in this dissertation is a custom kernel originally
designed to categorise text documents, with good results that closely rivalled
the linear and RBF kernels but did not match their classiﬁcation times (Sec-
tion 5.3.2.6).
Left for future work is the development of a custom, more discriminatory
kernel based on the model of the structural and random byte mutation gener-
ators. This could take into account the degree of mutation, data-to-signature
ratios and training data size, as well as cater natively for split, jumbled and
corrupted signatures. A guide to constructing kernels is given in [56].
9.3 Alternative feature representation
As discussed in Section 4.4, this dissertation uses n-grams to extract fea-
tures for the linear and RBF kernels. The ﬁndings of Section 5.3.3.1 suggest
that bi-grams o er superior performance over tri-grams at only marginally
less accuracy. This dissertation side-stepped values n > 3 because the num-
ber of features and hence memory requirements grow exponentially with n.
However, higher values of n could improve the classiﬁer’s accuracy, and in-
vestigating how accuracy is a ected by larger n will be insightful.
To be practically feasible, higher values of n must be approximated. One
approximation technique are 2v-grams suggested by Perdisci et al [52] as
an improvement over PayL [50], two network intrusion detection systems
outlined in Section 2.2.2. 2v-grams approximate higher numbers of n by
using a sliding window of size v + 2 when traversing the data. The idea is
to extract information about higher n-grams (n > 2) by measuring only the
occurrence frequency of byte pairs that are v bytes apart in the ﬂow.
An advantage of 2v-grams is that they work well with sophisticated at-
tack strategies such as polymorphic blending attacks, where normal bi-grams
perform poorly [52]. On the downside, however, 2v-grams are still prone to
the curse of dimensionality, although Perdisci et al [52] suggest to reduce the
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generalisation of n-grams; for v = 0 the technique degenerates to standard
bi-grams.
Another alternative approximation technique is Content-based Payload
Partitioning as used by Autograph [47] and Earlybird [14], both discussed in
Section 2.2.2. This technique divides the payload into variable length blocks
by computing Rabin ﬁngerprints [121] over a sliding window, with the sliding
window stopping when a predeﬁned Rabin ﬁngerprint is matched.
Rabin ﬁngerprints can be e ciently computed over sliding windows [121],
and have been shown to be robust to byte insertions, deletions and replace-
ments [47] – common cloaking techniques by worm authors. However, Rabin
ﬁngerprints sometimes generate very short blocks, yielding unspeciﬁc fea-
tures and consequently a high number of false alarms. At the other extreme,
Rabin ﬁngerprints may match the entire ﬂow payload, leading to long signa-
tures that are unsuitable for detecting worms. The workaround suggested in
Autograph [47] is to impose maximum and minimum block lengths.
9.4 Real-time detection
In this dissertation, the machine learning classiﬁers enjoyed the comforts of
a lab environment where the focus was accuracy rather than speed, but to
compete in the real world they need to meet strict real-time requirements.
This section outlines how real-time performance can be improved by (a) opti-
mising ﬂow reassembly, (b) partial ﬂow classiﬁcation, (c) dedicated hardware,
and (d) reducing the memory footprint.
9.4.1 Optimising ﬂow reassembly
The approach taken by this work is to detect worms in reassembled ﬂows
since this ensures that worms can be scanned in their entirety, even if they
are divided into several, potentially reordered, packets. The machine learning
classiﬁer thus sits at the top of the network stack, freed from worrying about
packets and seeing the network tra c simply as a continuous byte stream
that it can match to its training data.CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 131








Figure 9.1: Real-time ﬂow reassembly using a circular bu er. The
circular bu er keeps track of two regions by way of three pointers:
(i) a sequence of unprocessed packets, and (ii) packets that the ﬂow
analyser has requested to retain. Keeping the retained packets in
the bu er as long as possible avoids spilling them to the heap.
However, this may break strict real-time requirements if deployed in high
speed locations with immense tra c volumes, such as border gateways in
university campuses and large corporations. There is signiﬁcant overhead
involved in copying data packets between physical memories, such as from
the network card to main memory, as well as copying memory between kernel
and user level. Typically, when dealing with line-rate classiﬁcation, dedicated
hardware enables working o  the network interface’s memory directly, rather
than resorting to copying packets into main memory.
The impact of real-time ﬂow reassembly and possible ways of achieving it
on high speed network links was presented in [90]. Real-time ﬂow reassembly
in [90] is accomplished through the use of special-purpose network capturing
interfaces and a circular bu er, several hundred megabytes large, as shown in
Figure 9.1. The system ﬁlls the bu er and in parallel reassembles the ﬂows
directly from the bu er, thereby avoiding expensive memory copies.CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 132
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Figure 9.2: Partial ﬂow classiﬁcation
9.4.2 Partial ﬂow classiﬁcation
Besides possibly breaking real-time requirements, another disadvantage of
scanning fully reassembled ﬂows is that the worm’s attack cycle must be
completed, allowing the entire ﬂow to be reassembled, before the machine
learning classiﬁers begin their detection. By the time a malicious ﬂow has
been reassembled, passed to the classiﬁer and categorised by the classiﬁer,
the worm may have already inﬁltrated the host.
A logical solution is to initiate classiﬁcation when the ﬁrst packets arrive
on the wire, rather than waiting for the ﬂow to be reassembled in its entirety.
Figure 9.2 suggests how such on-the-ﬂy classiﬁcation could work in practice.
The idea is to continuously classify ﬂows while they are being reassembled
and to use the conﬁdence measure (as provided by Gaussian Processes) to
determine whether the information seen so far is su cient to label the ﬂow
as malicious or benign.
On-the-ﬂy classiﬁcation o ers challenging opportunities for future work.CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 133
What is the optimal conﬁdence threshold? What is the average number of
packets required to make a su ciently accurate classiﬁcation? And, most
importantly, can partial classiﬁcation accuracy match that of full ﬂow clas-
siﬁcation? Exploring such questions will be an interesting addition to this
work.
9.4.3 Dedicated hardware
A further possibility worthy of investigation is to improve real-time perfor-
mance by running the classiﬁer (in whole or in part) on dedicated hardware.
To be e ective, the dedicated hardware should sit as close as possible to
the network hardware, such as border routers and gateways, preferably even
share the same physical memory so that network ﬂows can be examined
instantly.
The dedicated hardware could take the form of a custom-designed inte-
grated circuit (IC) chip, which o ers the maximum possible performance.
On the downside, a classiﬁer fully hardwired into a circuit will be hard to
upgrade, tune and debug. Greater ﬂexibility, albeit at a slight performance
cost, could be gained by using conﬁgurable hardware such as that provided
by NetFPGA [122].
9.4.4 Reducing the memory footprint
As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, even with bi-gram extraction a feature vector
consists of 65,536 entries, possibly straining the available memory resources
for a large number of ﬂows in a real-time environment. Future work could
investigate reducing the memory footprint, for example using the following
methods:
• Feature selection. This involves selectively removing features from
the feature space and repeating the experiments to see if the accuracy
can be maintained without the removed features. Libsvm ships with a
tool that performs this selective feature removal [123].CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 134
• Sparse matrices. Instead of storing all entries of the feature vector
in an array, only the non-zero items could be stored in a sparse repre-
sentation. Libsvm o ers the option to store feature vectors as dense or
sparse matrices [98].
9.5 Online training
The machine learning classiﬁers used in this work separated training and
classiﬁcation not just by function but also by time: training is done o ine
and the results fed to the classiﬁer for online use. As it stands, the only way
to update the classiﬁer is to train a new classiﬁer o ine in the background
and hotswapping it in when ready.
Retraining the classiﬁer online o ers the advantage of being able to contin-
uously improve classiﬁers while they are in operation, potentially improving
their accuracy. The basic approach is to keep training classiﬁers incremen-
tally with fresh training data, as for example shown in [124]. Incremental
learning raises a number of intriguing questions for future work:
• Should the fresh training data be added when new training data is
available, or should the training data be collected and bundled before
updating the classiﬁer? If bundled, what bundle size will yield the best
speed-accuracy trade-o ?
• Should fresh training data (bundled or not) be added as soon as it is
available, or only when the system is under light load? Is it possible to
add the training data without risking that worms slip past during the
update?
• How does legacy data a ect the classiﬁer’s speed and accuracy? Can
legacy data be phased out as fresh training data is phased in?CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 135
Figure 9.3: Manual analysis in uncertain cases.
9.6 Cascading classiﬁers
As a stand-alone classiﬁer, Support Vector Machines have consistently per-
formed more accurately than Gaussian Processes throughout this disserta-
tion. At the same time, the conﬁdence measure returned by Gaussian Pro-
cesses has been shown to be a valuable tool since it o ers another angle on the
classiﬁcation – it can be ﬂagged for further processing when the conﬁdence
is low.
It would thus be interesting to investigate how accurately a chain of clas-
siﬁers performs with Gaussian Processes as the primary classiﬁer, handing
o  to a secondary classiﬁer in cases of uncertainty. What are possible can-
didates for the secondary classiﬁer? Two possible options are a) to involve a
human operator to manually analyse the prediction, and b) to hand o  fur-
ther analysis to a reﬁned machine learning classiﬁer that is slower but more
accurate.
9.6.1 Manual analysis
A possibility is to transfer control to a manual analysis stage where a human
operator examines the ﬂow. The manual analysis stage could be used both
as a last resort if all else fails, and as a reinforcement mechanism for the
machine learning algorithms in the early stages when the training data is
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Figure 9.4: Adding new training data in manual analysis.
How might an interface for a human operator look? When the classiﬁer
is uncertain about it’s classiﬁcation, the human analysis stage is notiﬁed
and prompts the operator as in Figure 9.3. The operator can then decide
whether to accept the classiﬁcation, ignore it or view details. The details of
the worm mutation could be displayed in tcpdump format augmented with
ﬂow statistics, such as byte frequency distributions, for the human operator
to make an informed decision.
The operator’s input a ects the accuracy of future predictions. If the
operator rejects the classiﬁcation, then the system will be less conﬁdent upon
the next similar encounter. If the operator accepts the classiﬁcation, the
system will be more conﬁdent.
After asking the operator the same question a number of times (say, 10
times), the system can prompt the operator as in Figure 9.4. The operator
can then decide whether the system should continue to prompt him, perform
the action automatically, or add the discovered mutation to the database.
Adding the signature to the database triggers the machine learning technique
to retrain its classiﬁers.
9.6.2 Reﬁned machine learning analysis
Rather than introducing a human operator into the loop, another option is
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classiﬁer is slower – based on the understanding that only a fraction of the
predictions by the Gaussian Processes will require further attention – but
must be more accurate than the primary Gaussian Processes classiﬁer.
Which machine learning classiﬁer meets these requirements for the sec-
ondary classiﬁer? One possibility is to equip the secondary classiﬁer with
a special-purpose kernel for detecting worm mutations, as outlined in Sec-
tion 9.2. Another possibility is to use a di erent feature representation such
as higher n-gram values, as discussed in Section 9.3.
9.7 Scalability
The approach taken by this dissertation is to build a binary classiﬁer for a
single worm that determines whether a ﬂow is a mutation of that worm. This
implies that a classiﬁer must be built for each known worm. A question left
for future work is whether this system scales well with a large number of
worms, and if not, how the system can be made more scalable.
A potential option to increase scalability is to build multi-class classiﬁers
that can distinguish between more than two classes (worms). Gaussian Pro-
cesses, and K-nearest neighbours support multi-class classiﬁcation natively,
while Support Vector Machines have to resort to workarounds such as one-
versus-rest [56]. It would be insightful to repeat the experiments in this
dissertation on popular SVM extensions for multi-class classiﬁcation, such as
those compared in [100].
Another approach to scale the system is to build multiple binary classiﬁers
(that is, one for each worm) and distribute them over to multiple machines,
for example, one per classiﬁer. There are a number of pitfalls when dis-
tributing to multiple machines, including but not restricted to unnecessary
and time-consuming copying of data between machines. Considerable care
must be taken that only necessary information ﬂows between machines.
A lighter approach to distribute the system is to physically factor out the
training to dedicated machines that build classiﬁers and upload these to the
classiﬁcation machines when ready.CHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 138
9.8 Summary
This chapter explored opportunities for future work:
• Defending against sophisticated worm attack strategies. Worm
authors often go to great lengths to ensure their worms evade detection,
for example by building polymorphic worms that mutate themselves
at each network hop, or by poisoning benign tra c with fake worms.
Future work could investigate how robust the machine learning classiﬁer
is to such sophisticated worm attack strategies.
• Designing a custom kernel. A kernel measures the similarity be-
tween two data points in a given feature space, and as such the accuracy
of the classiﬁer depends on how well the feature space can represent
the data at hand. Left for future work is the development of a custom,
more discriminatory kernel based on the model of the mutation gener-
ators. Future work can investigate whether such a custom kernel can
further improve the accuracy of this dissertation’s classiﬁer.
• Alternative feature representation. This work investigated uni-
grams, bi-grams and tri-grams to extract features for the linear and
RBF kernels, but higher value n-grams could improve the classiﬁer’s
accuracy further. Since the number of features grows exponentially
with n, this requires approximation techniques such as 2v-grams or
Content-based Payload Partitioning.
• Real-time detection. Future work can improve real-time perfor-
mance by a) optimising ﬂow reassembly by directly accessing the net-
work interface’s physical memory, b) classifying worms with only par-
tially reassembled ﬂows, and c) placing the classiﬁer on dedicated hard-
ware such as custom-built integrated circuit boards or reconﬁgurable
hardware.
• Online training. This work’s machine learning classiﬁers perform
training o ine, meaning that when new training data arrives a new
classiﬁer has to be built and hotswapped with the old classiﬁer. FutureCHAPTER 9. FUTURE WORK 139
work could investigate whether training the classiﬁer online can fur-
ther improve its accuracy. A possible approach is incremental learning,
where the classiﬁer is fed with new training data during live operation.
• Cascading classiﬁers. While the standalone Support Vector Ma-
chines has consistently performed more accurately than Gaussian Pro-
cesses, it would still be interesting to see how e ectively Gaussian Pro-
cesses and its conﬁdence value work in a chain of classiﬁers. Possible
candidates for the secondary classiﬁer handling uncertain cases are a
human operator performing manual analysis, and a reﬁned machine
learning classiﬁer that is slower but more accurate.
• Scalability. A task open for future work is to investigate the scala-
bility of this work’s implementation for large numbers of worms. One
approach is to upgrade the binary classiﬁer to a multi-class classiﬁer.
Another approach is to distribute the system, for example by separat-
ing the training and classiﬁcation stages onto two machines. A step
further is to distribute the system onto one machine per classiﬁer.Appendix A
Formulas of Support Vector
Machines
In its basic, linear form, Support Vector Machines is a hyperplane that max-
imises the distance to the support vectors in a training data set. The distance
of vector x to the hyperplane is given by:
u =   w ·   x   b (A.1)
where w is the normal vector to the hyperplane. The separating hyperplane
is deﬁned by u = 0, and the nearest points line on the planes which u = ±1.
Thus the margin m is
m =
1
||w||2 (A.2)
The problem of maximising the margin can be stated as an optimisation
problem [63]
min
1
2
||  w||
2 subject to yi(  w ·   x   b)   1, i (A.3)
where xi is the ith training data item and yi   {1, 1} its corresponding label.
By applying a Lagrangian the optimisation problem can be converted into
a Quadratic Programming problem where the objective function   depends
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solely on the Lagrange multiplier  :
min
   
 (   ) =    
min
1
2
N  
i=1
N  
j=1
yiyj(  xi ·   xj) i j  
N  
i=1
 i (A.4)
where N is the number of training data items. The Lagrangian is constrained
by the inequality
 i   0, i (A.5)
and the linear equality
N  
i=1
yi i = 0 (A.6)
The normal vector   w and the value of b can be calculated once the the
Lagrange multipliers have been found:
  w =
N  
i=1
yi i  xi, b =   w ·   xk   yk for some  k > 0 (A.7)
For non-linearly separable data sets there will be no separating hyper-
plane, yielding an inﬁnite solution in the above formula. Cortes and Vap-
nik [15] modiﬁed the optimization problem in Equation A.3 to allow (but
penalize) cases when no correct margin can be reached:
min
  w,b,   
1
2
||  w||
2 + C
N  
i=1
 i subject to yi(  w ·   x   b)   1    i, i (A.8)
where  i are slack variables that take into account margin errors, and the C
parameter is the softness of the margin – it trades o  margin width with the
number of margin errors. Transforming the optimisation problem into dual
form changes the constraint in Equation A.4 into a box constraint:
0    i   C, i (A.9)Appendix B
Receiver Operator
Characteristics Graphs
Receiver operator characteristics (ROC) [96] curve analysis presents a way
of quantifying the trade-o  between the detection rate (true positives) and
the false alarm rate (false positives). ROC curves have their roots in signal
detection and medical decision-making, and have recently become a popu-
lar way of analysing machine learning classiﬁers. This chapter presents an
overview of ROC curve analysis, following [125].
B.1 ROC graphs
ROC graphs are a two-dimensional depiction of the accuracy of a signal
detector plotting the true positive (y-axis) rate against the false positive
rate (x-axis) respectively as shown in Figure B.1. The true positive rate is
calculated by dividing the number of true positives by the total number of
positives, and the false positive rate is calculated by dividing the number of
false positives by the total number of negatives.
These two rates change in relation to another. That is, when the true pos-
itive rate is high, the false positive rate will be low, and vice versa. Naturally
this means that these two rates can be equal somewhere in the middle.
The basic idea of ROC graphs is to provide a visualisation of the trade-o 
142APPENDIX B. ROC GRAPHS 143

 
 
        
  
  
     
    
   
    
     
    
Figure B.1: Receiver operator characteristics (ROC) graph space
showing (i) the line of random performance, (ii) liberal and con-
servative regions, (iii) the point of perfect performance, and (iv)
the points of all positive and all negative classiﬁcations.
between the true and false positive rates, and hence an understanding of the
accuracy of a classiﬁer.
There are several general areas of interest in a ROC graph, as illustrated
in Figure B.1. First, the diagonal dividing line that connects the bottom left
to the top right corner represents random performance (guessing). Points
that lie above this line are better than random and points below this line are
worse than random. In theory, for classiﬁers there should be no points below
this dividing line because classiﬁers that perform worse than random could
be mirrored into the top half by simply inverting their outputs.
The top half of this diagonal line can be further split in half with a
perpendicular line. The left half of this new division shows conservative
(higher true positive than false positive rates) classiﬁers, whereas the rightAPPENDIX B. ROC GRAPHS 144
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Figure B.2: Receiver operator characteristics curves for various
performances.
half shows liberal (lower true positive than false positive rates) classiﬁers.
Classiﬁers in the conservative region make fewer false positive decisions,
with the extreme point being the bottom left corner which indicates a clas-
siﬁer that classiﬁes all instances as negative. This means, on the one hand,
that it will not produce any false positives, but on the other hand, will not
produce true positives either.
In the liberal region classiﬁers exhibit a good true positive rate but com-
mit a signiﬁcant amount of false positives. Again, with the extreme case
being the top right corner, which represents a classiﬁer that marks every-
thing as true.
Finally, the point in the top left corner represents a perfect classiﬁer.
This classiﬁer has a 100% true positive rate and a 0% false positive rate.
This point can also be used as a reference point whereby other points on the
ROC graph can be ranked by their distance to it.
B.2 ROC curves
The true advantage of ROC graphs does not come from single point interpre-
tation, but from the ability to characterise a classiﬁer’s performance model
as a curve. Figures B.2(a), B.2(b), and B.2(c), show the curves for an almostAPPENDIX B. ROC GRAPHS 145
perfect classiﬁers, a good classiﬁer, and a poor classiﬁer respectively.
To aid the interpretation of ROC curves, it is important to understand
how they are constructed. Obtaining a single point in the ROC space from a
classiﬁer is straightforward by simply calculating the true and false positive
rates for a classiﬁcation. But how can a single run like this be transformed
into a curve?
Curves are obtained from classiﬁers that attach a probability or ranking
to each prediction. For each possible probability1 or ranking a point is plot-
ted in the ROC space. These points joined together form the ROC curve.
As with the ROC graph itself, the left half of the curve represents the classi-
ﬁer’s performance under high (conservative) decision thresholds and the left
represents the classiﬁers performance under low (liberal) decision thresholds.
Curves can also be obtained for classiﬁers that do not yield a probability
or ranking with each prediction. One method is to obtain a conﬁdence value
in an ad-hoc manner, such as calculating the distance to a SVM’s separating
hyperplane. Another way of obtaining an estimate is to sort the test set’s
individual classiﬁcations by their conﬁdence values and then iterating over
these values, computing true and false positive rates for all classiﬁcations up
to and including the current value.
B.3 Area under curve
A single metric that can be obtained from these curves is the total area
under the curve (AUC) [97]. Classiﬁers with larger areas perform better, on
average, than classiﬁers with lower areas. Nevertheless, it is still possible for
classiﬁers with lower AUC’s to perform better than classiﬁers with higher
AUC’s for some regions of the graph.
1The default decision or probability threshold of classiﬁers is typically 0.5.Glossary
Anomaly detection In intrusion detection, anomaly detection systems are
equipped with a model of normal tra c. The idea is to detect in-
trusions by searching for tra c that does not correspond with this
model.
Botnet A network of infected hosts that can be remote controlled to perform
potentially malicious tasks.
Data-to-signature ratio The amount of data (padding) relative to the size
of the signature.
Decision surface see separating hyperplane.
Distributions (mathematics): generalisation of functions and probability
distributions
False negative Erroneously classifying something as negative, for example,
erroneously classifying malicious data as benign.
False positive Erroneously classifying something as positive, for example,
erroneously classifying benign data as malicious.
Flow see TCP/IP ﬂow.
Gaussian Processes A machine learning technique that yields similar re-
sults to Support Vector Machines, with the addition of returning a
conﬁdence value as part of its result.
Hyperplane See separating hyperplane.
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Intrusion detection systems Intrusion detection systems are special pur-
pose monitoring systems that attempt to identify break-ins.
K-nearest Neighbours A simple machine learning technique that surpris-
ingly often performs well.
Kernel Conceptually, kernels equip machine learning techniques such as
Support Vector Machines, with the ability to map non-linearly sep-
arable data points into di erent dimensions where they are linearly
separable.
Linear kernel The standard SVM kernel that tries to ﬁnd a dividing hyper-
plane by calculating the dot product on pattern vectors in the original
feature space.
Machine learning A sub-discipline of artiﬁcial intelligence and involves de-
veloping algorithms that allow computers to learn.
Misuse detection In intrusion detection, misuse detection systems are equipped
with models of known intrusions (or signatures). These models, known
as signatures, are used to identify intrusions by looking for matches in
the network tra c.
N-gram extraction A feature extraction technique counts occurrences of
all character combinations of size n, typically by linearly scanning the
data.
Network intrusion detection systems Network intrusion detection sys-
tems, are specially designed to focus on network related intrusions.
These systems are typically deployed at network gateways in organi-
zations, allowing them to act as ﬁlters for any incoming tra c.
Perceptron A type of artiﬁcial neural network that builds linear classiﬁers.
Predictive likelihood The conﬁdence measure in Gaussian Processes, which
is the sum (or in some cases the average) logarithms of all predictive
posteriors.GLOSSARY 148
Radial basis function (RBF) kernel A kernel that applies a Gaussian
function to the pattern vectors, implicitly taking them to a higher
space.
Separating hyperplane A line (2-dimensions), or hyperplane (higher di-
mensions) that divides the training data into disjoint groups. Equipped
with a separating hyperplane, a classiﬁer can then label a given test
data point based on its position relative to the hyperplane.
Signature E ectively a ﬁngerprint that can be used to uniquely identify
intrusions, such as worms. In its simplest form, it consists of a string
of characters (or bytes).
String kernel A kernel, originally developed for categorising text docu-
ments, that maps the input strings into the feature space generated by
all sub-sequences of a given size, where it applies the inner product.
Supervised learning Learning with labelled training data.
Support Vector Machines A machine learning technique known to per-
form particularly well at pattern recognition tasks such as text cate-
gorisation and hand-written digit recognition.
Support vectors In Support Vector Machines, support vectors are the key
data points close to the hyperplane that, if removed, would change the
location of the hyperplane.
TCP/IP ﬂow Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packet streams, where a stream is identiﬁed by the
source Internet Protocol (IP) address, source port number, destination
IP address, and destination port number.
True negative Correctly classifying something as negative, for example,
classifying benign data as benign.
True positive Correctly classifying something as positive, for example, clas-
sifying malicious data as malicious.GLOSSARY 149
Unsupervised learning Learning with unlabelled training data, such as
clustering.
Worm Worms are malicious programs that spread themselves to hosts on
the Internet by exploiting vulnerabilities in software applications.Bibliography
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